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SELF-DEPORTATION NATION 
K-Sue Park∗ 
“Self-deportation” is a concept to explain the removal strategy of making life so unbearable 
for a group that its members will leave a place.  The term is strongly associated with recent 
state and municipal attempts to “attack every aspect of an illegal alien’s life,” including 
the ability to find employment and housing, drive a vehicle, make contracts, and attend 
school.  However, self-deportation has a longer history, one that predates and made possible 
the establishment of the United States.  As this Article shows, American colonists pursued 
this indirect approach to remove native peoples as a prerequisite for establishing and 
growing their settlements.  The new nation then adopted this approach to Indian removal 
and debated using self-deportation to remove freed slaves; later, states and municipalities 
embraced self-deportation to keep blacks out of their jurisdictions and drive out the 
Chinese.  After the creation of the individual deportation system, the logic of self-
deportation began to work through the threat of direct deportation.  This threat burgeoned 
with Congress’s expansion of the grounds of deportability during the twentieth century 
and affects the lives of an estimated 22 million unauthorized persons in the United States 
today. 
This Article examines the mechanics of self-deportation and tracks the policy’s 
development through its application to groups unwanted as members of the American 
polity.  The approach works through a delegation of power to public and private entities 
who create subordinating conditions for a targeted group.  Governments have long used 
preemption as a tool to limit the power they cede to these entities.  In the United States, 
this pattern of preemption establishes federal supremacy in the arena of removal: 
Cyclically, courts have struck down state and municipal attempts to adopt independent 
self-deportation regimes, and each time, the executive and legislative branches have 
responded by building up the direct deportation system.  The history of self-deportation 
shows that the specific property interests driving this approach to removal shifted after 
abolition, from taking control of lands to controlling labor by placing conditions upon 
presence. 
This Article identifies subordination as a primary mode of regulating migration in 
America, which direct deportations both supplement and fuel.  It highlights the role that 
this approach to removal has played in producing the landscape of uneven racial 
distributions of power and property that is the present context in which it works.  It shows 
that recognizing self-deportation and its relationship to the direct deportation system is 
critical for understanding the dynamics of immigration law and policy as a whole.  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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An incentive called misery. 
— William Safire1 
 
Yet for all of its influence, the Migration was so vast that, throughout 
history, it has most often been consigned to the landscape, rarely the  
foreground. 
— Isabel Wilkerson2 
    INTRODUCTION 
“Self-deportation” refers to an indirect method for removing from a 
jurisdiction a group not desired as part of the polity.3  The term popu-
larly attached to this removal method in 1994,4 when satire artists Lalo 
Alcaraz and Esteban Zul used it in a fake press release responding to 
California’s Proposition 187, which would have prohibited state-run 
hospitals and schools from serving undocumented immigrants.5  Shortly 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 1 William Safire, Self-Deportation?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1994, at A15. 
 2 ISABEL WILKERSON, THE WARMTH OF OTHER SUNS 13 (2010). 
 3 Indirect laws are laws designed to achieve one effect that in turn produces a second effect, 
which is the ultimate purpose of the law.  The lawmaker who designs a self-deportation law pre-
sumes that controlling social situations through the law can engineer a person’s behavior.  Professor 
Hiroshi Motomura has observed that the subfederal legislation of the 2000s worked indirectly to 
influence migration.  HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW 58–59, 69–76 
(2014); see also Hiroshi Motomura, Hartman Hotz Lecture, What Is “Comprehensive Immigration 
Reform”? Taking the Long View, 63 ARK. L. REV. 225, 234 (2010) [hereinafter Motomura, What Is 
“Comprehensive Immigration Reform”?] (“‘[I]mmigration law’ is not just a set of laws on the books 
that regulate admission and deportation.  It includes a broader array of ways in which we encourage 
or discourage population flows.”). 
 4 The term only recently came to describe the state policy that is the subject of this Article.  
Before that, news media employed it occasionally and inconsistently to describe a variety of situa-
tions, including migration to the United States from Ireland in the nineteenth century, black migra-
tion out of the United States in the late nineteenth century, and the failure of a deportee to leave 
the country at the prescribed time in the mid-twentieth century.  See, e.g., Deportation Case Ruling 
is Promised, WASH. POST, Apr. 23, 1957, at A2 (reporting on the case Heikkinen v. United States, 
355 U.S. 273 (1958)); Our Foreign Population, DET. FREE PRESS, Aug. 28, 1883, at 4; Self  
Deportation, WICHITA DAILY EAGLE, Mar. 6, 1894, at 2 (describing the departure of thirty black 
people from Atlanta for Africa). 
 5 Robert Mackey, The Deep Comic Roots of “Self-Deportation,” N.Y. TIMES: THE LEDE 
(Feb. 1, 2012, 8:53 AM), http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/02/01/the-deep-comic-roots-of-self-
deportation/ [https://perma.cc/4SH5-XNW8].  In the press release, the group “Hispanics Against 
Liberal Takeover” called for the creation of “Self Deportation Centers.”  Id.; Lalo Alcaraz, Hispanics 
for Wilson’s First Press Release Touted “Self-Deportation,” POCHO ÑEWS Y SATIRE (Jan. 31, 
2012), http://pocho.com/hispanics-for-wilsons-first-press-release-touting-self-deportation/ [https:// 
perma.cc/D6M4-MPY4].  After Mitt Romney declared during a presidential primary debate in 
2012 that “the answer is self-deportation,” see Lucy Madison, Romney on Immigration: I’m for 
“Self-Deportation,” CBS NEWS (Jan. 24, 2012), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/romney-on- 
immigration-im-for-self-deportation/ [https://perma.cc/4H5S-M3QK], an Atlantic columnist com-
mented that the proposal “seems like some kind of political joke taken too far.”  Adam Martin, 
“Self-Deportation” Really Is a Joke, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 1, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/ 
politics/archive/2012/02/self-deportation-really-joke/332370/ [https://perma.cc/4YWV-FZM9]. 
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thereafter, their fictional press contact, the “militant self-deportationist” 
Daniel D. Portado, praised the law’s self-deportation strategy first in a 
mock interview, and then when he appeared in real news.6  Within 
months, the term made its way into public political discourse: California 
Governor Pete Wilson, champion of Proposition 187, explained to New 
York Times columnist William Safire that “[i]f it’s clear to you that you 
cannot be employed, and that you and your family are ineligible for 
services, you will self-deport.”7  In the 2000s, states and municipalities 
introduced a stream of legislation8 that, often in a single bill, attempted 
to make it impossible for unauthorized individuals to find shelter or em-
ployment, make contracts, or access public benefits, resident tuition 
rates, and drivers’ licenses; they levied increased state-level criminal 
sanctions against unauthorized persons, allowed local police officers to 
enforce federal immigration laws, and otherwise targeted immigrants’ 
lives, such as by banning the display of foreign flags and the use of 
languages other than English in public institutions.9  Legislators will-
ingly explained that self-deportation was the purpose of the bills.   
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 6 Mackey, supra note 5; Martin, supra note 5; Ira Glass, Losers, THIS AMERICAN LIFE (Nov. 
8, 1996), https://www.thisamericanlife.org/41/politics/act-three [https://perma.cc/MLA2-TVPK]. 
 7 Safire, supra note 1. 
 8 Between 2005 and 2007 alone, the number of such bills that states introduced grew by more 
than 420% a year.  See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE LAWS RE-
LATED TO IMMIGRANTS AND IMMIGRATION: JANUARY 1–JUNE 30, 2008, at 1 (2008), 
http://www.ncsl.org/print/immig/immigreportjuly2008.pdf [http://perma.cc/HM5B-SLHE].  
 9 See, e.g., H.R. 56, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 9, 2011 Ala. Laws 888, 901 (contracting provisions); 
ALASKA STAT. §§ 44.12.300–390 (2017); S. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess., 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 
450 (codified as amended in scattered sections of ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. tits. 11, 13, 23, 28, and 
41); H.R. 2779, 48th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 8(a) (Ariz. 2007); H.R. 1024, 86th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 
(Ark. 2007); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-11-205 (2016); H.R. 07-1073, 66th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 
(Colo. 2007); IDAHO CODE § 73-121 (2017); S. 70, 2007 Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2007); Hazleton, 
Pa., Ordinance 2006-18, Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance (Sept. 12, 2006), amended by 
Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-40 (Dec. 13, 2006); and Ordinance 2007-6 (Mar. 21, 2007); Hazleton, 
Pa., Ordinance 2006-13 (Aug. 15, 2006), enjoined in part by Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 724 F.3d 
297, 300 (3d Cir. 2013) (holding that the ordinance’s employment and housing provisions were 
preempted federal law); Frederick County, Md., Ordinance No. 12-03-598 (Feb. 22, 2012) (repealed 
2015); Nashville & Davidson County, Tenn., Substitute Ordinance No. BL2006-1185 (passed Feb. 
6, 2007, vetoed Feb. 12, 2007); Farmers Branch, Tex., Ordinance No. 2952 (Jan. 22, 2008), invali-
dated by Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 726 F.3d 524, 526 (5th Cir. 2013) 
(en banc); Farmers Branch, Tex., Resolution No. 2006-130 (Nov. 13, 2006) (repealed 2017); Kevin 
Bouffard, Avon Park Ordinance Fails, THE LEDGER (July 25, 2006, 6:45 AM), https:// 
www.theledger.com/news/20060725/avon-park-ordinance-fails [https://perma.cc/F8BB-N9MB] 
(discussing the proposal and narrow defeat of an ordinance in Avon Park, Florida, called the “Illegal 
Immigration Relief Act”); Vasquez v. City of Farmers Branch, Texas, MALDEF (Sept. 22, 2008), 
https://www.maldef.org/2008/09/vasquez-v-city-of-farmers-branch-texas/ [https://perma.cc/T4NP-
58MP] (discussing litigation around three successive anti-immigrant ordinances in Farmers Branch, 
Texas, beginning in 2006; the final ordinance was found preempted by federal law,  Villas at 
Parkside Partners, 726 F.3d at 526).  In 2006, Arizona introduced a proposition to institute English 
as the official language of the state alongside a proposition that would have limited access to adult 
education (and therefore English classes) on the basis of citizenship status.  See 2006 Ballot Propo-
sitions & Judicial Performance Review: Proposition 103, ARIZ. SEC’Y OF STATE (Sept. 2006), 
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Arizona’s S.B. 1070 in 2010 openly declared it intended “to discourage 
and deter the unlawful entry and presence of aliens” by making “attri-
tion through enforcement” — Kansas Secretary of State Kris Kobach’s 
term of art for self-deportation — the law of the land.10  In 2011, when 
Alabama passed H.B. 56, its sponsor, former Representative Micky 
Hammon, explained the law was designed to “attack[] every aspect of an 
illegal alien’s life,” and “to make it difficult for them to live here so they 
will deport themselves.”11 
These laws unified wildly divergent legal provisions — civil and 
criminal, those involving alienage and immigration — through a single 
underlying logic: they sought to make individuals into agents of the 
state’s goal of their removal by making their lives unbearable.12  This 
Article examines the long history of this approach to removal, and shows 
that it originated during the earliest period of English colonization in 
America.  Although the scholarly literature on self-deportation has  
focused almost exclusively on the recent subfederal legislation, the roots 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
https://apps.azsos.gov/election/2006/info/PubPamphlet/english/Prop103.htm [https://perma.cc/ 
PTG8-MFZF]; 2006 Ballot Propositions & Judicial Performance Review: Proposition 300, ARIZ. 
SEC’Y OF STATE (Sept. 2006), https://apps.azsos.gov/election/2006/info/PubPamphlet/english/ 
Prop300.htm [https://perma.cc/HEQ5-8GEE].  As many politicians and reporters pointed out, the 
two bills contradicted each other unless they were designed for the purpose of making life more 
difficult for immigrants.  See Jesse McKinley, Arizona Law Takes a Toll on Nonresident Students, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2008), https://nyti.ms/2F0VFax  [https://perma.cc/P3MC-47X6].  For an  
analysis of how denying immigrants drivers’ licenses attacks their social and economic survival, see 
Annie Lai, Confronting Proxy Criminalization, 92 DENV. L. REV. 879, 887–93 (2015). 
 10 S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. § 1, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 450 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. tits. 11, 13, 23, 28, and 41).  Kobach drafted much of 
this legislation and served as the architect of Romney’s self-deportation platform.  Jefferson Morley, 
The Man Behind Romney’s “Self-Deportation” Plan, SALON (Feb. 23, 2012, 3:44 AM), https://www. 
salon.com/2012/02/22/the_man_behind_romneys_self_deportation_dreams/ 
[https://perma.cc/K5FM-7VVV]. 
 11 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NO WAY TO LIVE: ALABAMA’S IMMIGRANT LAW 1 (2011), 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us1211ForUpload_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/H5GG-
WTTK]; see also Diane McWhorter, The Strange Career of Juan Crow, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2012), 
https://nyti.ms/2F8MUMS [https://perma.cc/Q3EE-XD76]. 
 12 By reading these types of provisions together, and identifying a common logic at work across 
genres of laws, I claim neither that the laws serve no purposes other than self-deportation, nor that 
the overlap between these genres and self-deportation law is total.  I presume that people retain 
agency under all manner of life-challenging circumstances and that all laws elicit a broad range of 
responses.  I do not aim to identify the outer limits of self-deportation policy in each situation, but 
rather, its work across a range of historical circumstances, in order to discern the pattern of its 
development.  In reading self-deportation across genres of law, I follow Kobach’s lead: he empha-
sizes targeting employment (“when the jobs dry up, unauthorized aliens self-deport”), Kris W.  
Kobach, Attrition Through Enforcement: A Rational Approach to Illegal Immigration, 15 TULSA J. 
COMP. & INT’L L. 155, 157 (2008) [hereinafter Kobach, Attrition Through Enforcement], and bring-
ing unauthorized persons into more frequent and more onerous contact with law enforcement  
(people are more likely to leave “[w]hen the risks of being detained and/or prosecuted go up dra-
matically”), id. at 160; see also Kris W. Kobach, Reinforcing the Rule of Law: What States Can and 
Should Do to Reduce Illegal Immigration, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 459, 471 (2008) [hereinafter  
Kobach, Reinforcing the Rule of Law]. 
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of this policy lie in debates and practices that were long central to Indian 
Removal and which evolved through deliberations over the fate of 
emancipated slaves.  Between 1827 and 1830, for example, the Georgia 
legislature passed a series of “extension laws” targeting Cherokee lands 
and sovereignty and, like the Arizona legislature in 2010, openly de-
clared these laws “calculated to induce [the Indians] to remove.”13   
Anticipating abolition during the Civil War, a U.S. congressman from 
Pennsylvania warned that a state that did not pass legislation to keep 
free blacks out would see “great swarms of fugitives — thousands and 
tens of thousands of them —  . . . come like black locusts, and settle 
down upon us.”14  The policy then acquired new life with the establish-
ment and growth of the modern deportation regime during the era of 
Chinese Exclusion, the Mexican Removals of the Great Depression, and 
beyond.15 
Yet the tactic of self-deportation remains little understood.  In par-
ticular, the notion that recent self-deportation laws were an unprece-
dented state and local effort to fill gaps left by the federal government’s 
failure to enforce immigration laws is still prevalent.16  Politicians have 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 13 TIM ALAN GARRISON, THE LEGAL IDEOLOGY OF REMOVAL 107 (2002) (quoting ACTS 
OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA, 1829 (Milledgeville, Camak & 
Ragland 1830) (alteration in original). 
 14 CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1644 (1862). 
 15 In synthesizing these histories, I follow a broader project advanced by Professors Gerald  
Neuman, Hiroshi Motomura, Kerry Abrams, and others who have demonstrated how immigration 
law scholarship’s traditional categories and frameworks have tended to obscure the full spectrum 
of laws that have controlled migration and populations they affect.  See, e.g., HIROSHI MOTOMURA, 
AMERICANS IN WAITING 10–12 (2006); Kerry Abrams, The Hidden Dimension of Nineteenth-
Century Immigration Law, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1353, 1355 (2009); Motomura, What Is “Comprehen-
sive Immigration Reform”?, supra note 3, at 234; Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American 
Immigration Law (1776–1875), 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1836–37 (1993).  Abrams highlights  
scholars’ failure to recognize the impact of indirect as well as direct laws governing immigration 
and points out that many direct and indirect immigration laws historically controlled interstate 
rather than “international” migration.  Id. at 1355–56.  Others have explored how lawyers and 
courts have constructed the category of “immigrant” and “alien” to encompass Native Americans, 
slaves, and free blacks for the purpose of coercing their migration.  See, e.g., KUNAL M. PARKER, 
MAKING FOREIGNERS 88–89 (2015); DEBORAH A. ROSEN, AMERICAN INDIANS AND STATE 
LAW 156 (2007); Lolita K. Buckner Inniss, Tricky Magic: Blacks as Immigrants and the Paradox of 
Foreignness, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 85, 89–107 (1999); Leti Volpp, The Indigenous as Alien, 5 U.C. 
IRVINE L. REV. 289, 300–15 (2015). 
 16 See, e.g., Kobach, Attrition Through Enforcement, supra note 12, at 156 (stating that self-
deportation, or “attrition through enforcement,” “has never been the immigration strategy of the 
United States”); Gerald L. Neuman, Aliens as Outlaws: Government Services, Proposition 187, and 
the Structure of Equal Protection Doctrine, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1425, 1445 (1995) (“The problem is 
framed by the peculiar circumstance that the state has a legitimate interest in deterring ‘illegal’ 
aliens from residence but no power to remove them directly.”); David S. Rubenstein, Immigration 
Structuralism: A Return to Form, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 81, 82 (2013) (“Frustrated 
[with Congress and the Executive], and by default, states and localities increasingly have sought to 
‘cooperate’ in immigration enforcement through self-help measures.”); Benjamin D. Galloway, 
Comment, Perpetual Congressional Inaction: State Regulation of Immigration in Response to Lack 
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reinforced the idea that self-deportation is a recent and marginal phe-
nomenon.  When Mitt Romney declared on the 2012 presidential cam-
paign trail that “[t]he answer [to the immigration question] is self- 
deportation,”17 even members of his own party dismissed this platform 
as unheard of and cruel.  Newt Gingrich called it laughable for Romney 
“to believe that somebody’s grandmother is going to be so cut off that 
she is going to self deport. . . .  He certainly shows no concern for the 
humanity of people who are already here.”18  Similarly, future President 
Trump attributed Romney’s loss to this position, commenting: “[h]e had 
a crazy policy of self deportation which was maniacal . . . .  It sounded 
as bad as it was . . . .”19 
In this Article, I analyze the legal phenomenon of “self-deportation.”  
The oxymoronic quality of the term captures the logic by which the 
strategy works: it is a variety of state-sponsored coercive removal that 
assigns some agency to individuals in their own departure.  Although 
this term only recently came to popularly describe this phenomenon, 
“self-deportation” long predates the modern era as a serious government 
strategy for controlling the migration of undesired populations.20  Parts 
I and II describe how American lawmakers repeatedly turned to indirect 
legal strategies to pursue the mass removal of unwanted groups.  Section 
I.A describes how colonists who arrived to take possession of land in 
America realized that they could not use direct methods to remove the 
people already living there but could make them remove themselves by 
using law to target every aspect of their lives.  This indirect policy made 
it possible for colonial officials to maintain diplomatic relations with 
tribes and helped colonial settlements avoid war by distancing official 
acts from the acts of private entities.  However, settlers escalated conflict 
with native nations in ways that threatened to undermine the twin pro-
jects of expansion and removal.  Colonial officials and the British Crown 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
of Reform, 65 MERCER L. REV. 795, 826 (2014).  Professor Linus Chan notes that “[p]re-emption’s 
role in the S.B. 1070 litigation is unsurprising as it has been used to challenge state based immigra-
tion regulation for more than a century.”  R. Linus Chan, The Right to Travel: Breaking Down the 
Thousand Petty Fortresses of State Self-Deportation Laws, 34 PACE L. REV. 814, 816–17 (2014) 
(citing Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1875)). 
 17 Mitt Romney Talks “Self-Deportation”; More About What that Really Means, AMERICA’S 
VOICE (Jan. 25, 2012), http://americasvoiceonline.org/blog/mitt_romney_talks_self-deportation_ 
more_about_what_that_really_means/ [https://perma.cc/99LC-5DLG]. 
 18 Matthew Jaffe, Gingrich Mocks Romney’s “Self-Deportation” Policy, ABC NEWS (Jan. 25, 
2012), https://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/01/gingrich-mocks-romneys-self-deportation-policy/ 
[https://perma.cc/TX9T-6E3F]. 
 19 Kevin Robillard, Trump: “Self-Deportation” Cost Votes, POLITICO (Nov. 26, 2012, 3:42 PM), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2012/11/trump-romneys-crazy-policy-of-self-deportation-cost-votes-
084238 [https://perma.cc/8P29-W6S7].  
 20 In this Article, I refer to “migration” interchangeably with “immigration” and “emigration,” 
since self-deportation policies cause interstate migration.  I also address historical periods when the 
usage of these terms differed from contemporary usage.  Neuman, for example, writes that “nineteenth-
century usage more frequently referred to ‘emigration’ and ‘emigrants.’”  Neuman, supra note 15, 
at 1837 n.19. 
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therefore attempted to constrain such settlers by preempting private and 
unlicensed purchases of native land.  Section I.B.1 illustrates how these 
preemptive measures evolved into doctrine in U.S. removal policy when 
courts prohibited states from legislating public discrimination.  Shortly 
after the courts checked the states’ attempts to create independent self-
deportation regimes, the federal legislative and executive branches ex-
ercised their supremacy in the realm of removal by undertaking the 
mass deportation of tribes.  Section I.B.2 explores how the nation’s ex-
perience with Indian Removal influenced its anticipation of abolition.  
After abolition, the Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition on public dis-
crimination also widely permitted private discrimination, which came 
to perform new work, as employers increasingly turned to nonwhite  
foreigners for cheap labor.  Subordination, as a mechanism of removal, 
became a means of regulating both migration and labor at once. 
Part II shows how the influx of immigrants to meet these labor needs 
sparked another round of state and local efforts to legislate public dis-
crimination as a means of promoting self-deportation.  Again, courts 
found these laws preempted by federal supremacy in the realm of  
removal; these laws again elicited a strong legislative and executive  
response in the form of a deportation initiative — this time, the estab-
lishment of the individual deportation system during the late nineteenth 
century.  Section II.A analyzes the way the national removal system 
evolved as the federal government developed its deportation system in 
relation to self-deportation policy.  Specifically, the courts have allowed 
states and municipalities to increase federal direct removal capacity, 
while the deportation option has allowed the legislative and executive 
branches to combine direct and indirect methods and expand the range 
and dynamics of federal removal techniques.  Section II.B follows the 
development of federal self-deportation policy through the end of the 
twentieth century to the present.  Once again, courts preempted discrim-
inatory subfederal self-deportation legislation; and, once more, the fed-
eral legislative and executive branches dramatically escalated federal 
deportation policy in ways that maximize its self-deportation effects.  In-
deed, the threat of the deportation system has grown so far beyond the 
government’s ability to enforce deportation laws that now, far from ob-
scuring its aim of removal, the public spotlight on deportations has 
eclipsed the effect of the deportation system’s threat: the subordination 
of deportable persons as a means of controlling their labor. 
Part III describes the lessons that this history imparts for our under-
standing of self-deportation policy and U.S. immigration law more 
broadly.  It focuses on how the creation of the deportation system trans-
formed a policy marked by distinct delegations to subfederal and private 
entities, before discussing the policy’s structural limitations and costs.  
The range of actors that the government depends upon to carry out self-
deportation policies includes private entities, states, and cities.  States 
and cities have frequently pursued the removal of unwanted populations 
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by attempting to pass independent self-deportation legislation, openly 
articulating tenets of a policy that otherwise tends to work in under-
stated and nonmaximalist registers.  Following colonial strategies of 
preemption, courts have used the principle of preemption to affirm the 
federal government’s supremacy in the realm of removal and, hence, its 
coordinating role.  When federal courts have checked states and cities 
in this way, the legislative and executive branches have repeatedly re-
sponded to states’ and cities’ expressions of agitation with harsh na-
tional direct deportation initiatives.  These developments include the 
mass deportation of tribes in the 1830s, the creation of the deportation 
system during the era of Chinese Exclusion, and the streamlining of de-
portation processes to facilitate mass removal that is ongoing now. 
These repeated subfederal attempts to introduce such legislation 
have occasioned an explicit conversation between state actors about self-
deportation that lies at the surface of an immigration system permeated 
by the logic of the policy.  Indeed, the debates over this legislation rep-
resent rare instances where policymakers have both explicitly advocated 
for self-deportation and rejected it.  These clear expressions notwith-
standing, the phenomenon I describe below is not one characterized by 
global intent.  Rather, the development of self-deportation policy reflects 
the outcomes of the aggregate actions of a multitude of different agents, 
both public and private, whose incentives and berth of action have been 
guided by institutional structures not of their making, which usually 
long preceded these agents’ entry into the arena of removal.  The arc of 
this history furthermore reflects only the prevailing trends that have 
emerged from a series of highly contested debates over national removal 
policy in every instance.  Though self-deportation has worked across a 
range of historical circumstances, it has largely escaped assessment and 
analysis, likely because its indirect design evolved from colonial policies 
meant to obscure the goal of removal and thereby guard settler-tribal 
diplomatic relations.  The legacy of this history is an indirect system for 
regulating migration that is diffuse in its operation and whose compo-
nent provisions are more difficult to detect than laws that announce 
their purpose of regulating migration or border crossings.21  Most oper-
ate not independently, but together and with background conditions, to 
produce compounded effects, which government actors do not oversee 
and thus cannot measure or record.22 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 21 Professors Adam Cox and Eric Posner have argued that the “second-order” question of insti-
tutional design is critically important, but often overshadowed by “first-order” questions concerning 
immigration law’s substantive goals.  Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order Structure 
of Immigration Law, 59 STAN. L. REV. 809, 811–12 (2007). 
 22 These laws are characteristic of a legal system that governs in “disjointed and indirect modes.” 
Desmond King & Robert C. Lieberman, The Civil Rights State: How the American State Develops 
Itself, in THE MANY HANDS OF THE STATE 178, 194 (Kimberly J. Morgan & Ann Shola Orloff 
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Far from a passing phenomenon, self-deportation forms both the fuel 
and firmament of national removal policy.  It has had an influence upon 
life and migration in America that is both diffuse and, as Isabel Wilkerson 
wrote of the Great Migration, “so vast that, throughout history, it has 
most often been consigned to the landscape, rarely the foreground.”23  
Its mechanism, which Safire described as “[a]n incentive called  
misery,”24 now affects the lives of minority groups within a consolidated 
territory, rather than communities external to one that is expanding.  
Consequently, in addition to causing removal and deterring entry — 
functioning as “get out” and “stay out” laws25 — self-deportation subor-
dinates the target group.  This subordination necessarily outsizes any 
migration the laws can provoke, since all those who leave will suffer, 
while not all those who suffer will leave. 
This Article illuminates a locus of uncontrolled and hidden power in 
United States immigration policy that is urgent to comprehend as self-
deportation policy enters a new stage in the twenty-first century.  At a 
time when policymakers’ vociferous advocacy for self-deportation is still 
fresh, it is critical to honestly assess the mechanisms and major actors 
of a ubiquitous mode of immigration regulation that has heretofore 
largely escaped acknowledgment or examination.  Without such a reck-
oning, the optics of self-deportation policy that make it so elusive create 
conditions under which policymakers can misunderstand or disavow re-
sponsibility for the effects of their own policy.26  This analysis finally 
underscores the extent to which the policy has depended on the actions 
of local and private entities who help shape its target: people’s everyday 
lives.  Building on its observations of how the policy delegates power to 
private and subfederal entities, this Article concludes by highlighting 
the limitations on the government’s ability to take that power back. 
I.  HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS OF SELF-DEPORTATION 
From the early colonial period, American lawmakers contemplated 
the mass removal of groups they viewed as outside their polity, including 
natives, American-born black people, and nonwhite immigrants, and 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
eds., 2017).  Work in the field of American political development, inspired by legal realism, increas-
ingly recognizes indirect law and policymaking as the principal mode of operation for the American 
state.  See, e.g., William J. Novak, The Myth of the “Weak” American State, 113 AM. HIST. REV. 
752, 763 (2008).  
 23 WILKERSON, supra note 2, at 13. 
 24 Safire, supra note 1. 
 25 Chan, supra note 16, at 816. 
 26 In 2013, Reince Priebus, then Republican National Committee Chairman, specifically ob-
jected to the term “self-deportation,” calling Romney’s use of the word “horrific,” and added that 
“[i]t’s not something that has anything to do with our party.”  Aaron Blake, Priebus: Romney’s Self-
Deportation Comment Was “Horrific,” WASH. POST (Aug. 16, 2013), https://wapo.st/16QEhMN 
[https://perma.cc/7ZCB-8JAZ]. 
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repeatedly considered using indirect legal strategies that targeted the 
lives of these groups to remove them.27  Part I traces the development 
of indirect removal strategies from the colonial period through the nine-
teenth century.  Section I.A describes how colonists came to rely first on 
indirect methods to remove native peoples, and then preemption as a 
means of controlling this approach.  Though the British Crown’s  
attempt to similarly restrain the colonies through preemption provided 
part of the impetus for independence, as section I.B.1 relates, the United 
States immediately adopted identical preemptive measures to coordinate 
settlers’ actions with its own.  When states tested the limit of these  
contraints and attempted to institute independent self-deportation poli-
cies, courts insisted on federal supremacy over removal, prompting the 
executive and legislative branches to move forward with a direct depor-
tation effort to supplement their indirect approach: the mass deportation 
of tribes.  Section I.B.2 shows how these dynamics in removal policy  
reappeared during debates over how to remove freed slaves during the 
antebellum period, culminating in abolition, the passage of the Four-
teenth Amendment, and the search for new sources of cheap labor and 
new forms of labor control.  
A.  Indian Removal in the Colonies: An Indirect  
Strategy that Obscured Its Own Aim 
The first two centuries of Indian Removal represent the earliest  
development of indirect removal laws in America.  The colonies, to some 
extent, also engaged in the practice of directly removing individuals by 
enforcing “poor laws,” more commonly known as laws of settlement and 
removal, which provided for the removal of indigent people to their 
home parishes on the public fisc.  Usually, individuals were removed to 
neighboring parishes, but sometimes parishes paid their fare back to 
their country of origin.28  Writing about similar poor laws passed by 
states during the first century of the United States, Professors Gerald 
Neuman and Hidetaka Hirota have pointed out that the antecedents of the 
individual deportation system lie in this history of expulsion of the poor.29 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 27 In each of these examples, the consideration of indirect removal tactics reached the level of a 
national conversation.  While this Article focuses on the history of the development of this specific 
approach to removal, in each instance the approach constituted but one of many ways — including 
programs to encourage assimilation and detention or incarceration — through which governments 
variously sought to manage and control these different groups. 
 28 See Nian-Sheng Huang, Financing Poor Relief in Colonial Boston, 8 MASS. HIST. REV. 73, 
77 (2006); Howard Mackey, Social Welfare in Colonial Virginia: The Importance of the English Old 
Poor Law, 36 HIST. MAG. PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH 357, 360 (1967); Howard Mackey, 
The Operation of the English Old Poor Law in Colonial Virginia, 73 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 
29, 38–39 (1965). 
 29 See HIDETAKA HIROTA, EXPELLING THE POOR 9 (2017); Neuman, supra note 15, at  
1846–59. 
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While colonies occasionally directly deported individuals, the bulk 
of removal that colonial governments sought to control and manage was 
indirect.  British colonists’ primary interest in North America, before 
long, became the appropriation of land on a vast scale.30  As Professor 
Christopher Tomlins notes, the elevation of “land over people as the  
primary object of the colonizer’s attention” during the late seventeenth 
century was “a peculiarity of the English” that “rearranged both the  
legalities and the institutional mechanisms of colonizing accordingly.”31  
The main prerequisite to colonists’ ability to take possession of lands 
was the mass removal of the people who lived on them.  Colonists had 
no capacity to do so directly.  However, they quickly realized that their 
own settlement created hostile conditions that caused native peoples to 
remove themselves without always being legible as an assault on tribes 
that would lead them to declare war.32  Colonists therefore pursued an 
indirect removal policy by passing laws and building institutions that 
had the effect of attacking native peoples’ lives from every angle,  
impacting their health, safety, and freedom of mobility, and their ability 
to find food, shelter, and maintain kinship bonds and political orders.  
Importantly, if colonists caused tribes to “self-deport,” in so doing, they 
did not expel tribes from territories that were already in colonists’  
possession.  Rather, colonists first claimed territories as their own by  
expelling tribes.  Their settlement everywhere constituted encroachment. 
As I describe below, the colonial period constituted an experimental 
incubation period for the indirect approach of removal through settle-
ment that, by the time of the Revolutionary War, had become a well 
established and favorite tool.  Where direct removal would have imme-
diately triggered war, indirect removal methods offered the advantages 
of cost efficiency and preserving settlers’ diplomatic position vis-à-vis 
tribes.  In 1783, General Philip Schuyler therefore advised Congress: 
[A]s our settlements approach their country, [the tribes] must, from the scar-
city of game, which that approach will induce to, retire farther back, and 
dispose of their lands, unless they dwindle comparatively to nothing, as all 
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 30 See BERNARD BAILYN, THE PEOPLING OF BRITISH NORTH AMERICA 66–67 (1986) 
(“Land speculation was everyone’s work and it affected everyone . . . . Every farmer with an extra 
acre of land became a land speculator — every town proprietor, every scrambling tradesman who 
could scrape together a modest sum for investment.”). 
 31 CHRISTOPHER TOMLINS, FREEDOM BOUND 133 (2006). 
 32 Eric Kades, The Dark Side of Efficiency: Johnson v. M’Intosh and the Expropriation of  
American Indian Lands, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1065, 1146 (2000).  Further, comparing English coloni-
zation to Spanish colonization, Professor Eric Kades writes that “[t]he difference between the two 
colonial methods was simple: the Americans engaged in widespread agricultural settlement; the 
Spanish generally did not.”  Id. 
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savages have done . . . and thus leave us the country without the expence of 
a purchase, trifling as that will probably be.33 
Two months later, George Washington endorsed Schuyler’s view in a 
letter: 
[T]he Indians . . . will ever retreat as our Settlements advance upon them 
and they will be as ready to sell, as we are to buy; That it is the cheapest as 
well as the least distressing way of dealing with them, none who are  
acquainted with the Nature of Indian warfare, and has ever been at the 
trouble of estimating the expence of one, and comparing it with the cost of 
purchasing their Lands, will hesitate to acknowledge.34 
When the war ended, the new federal government worried about the 
fiscal and human resources it would require to directly remove native 
peoples from the lands the British surrendered to it.35  In 1789, Secretary 
of War Henry Knox observed that “the finances of the United States 
would not at present admit of the operation [of military conquest],”36 
and opined, “it is most probable that the Indians will, by the invariable 
operation of the causes which have hitherto existed in their intercourse 
with the whites, be reduced to a very small number.”37  Settlement, he 
reiterated, would achieve the same effect: “As the settlements of the 
whites shall approach near to the Indian boundaries established by  
treaties, the game will be diminished, and the lands being valuable to 
the Indians only as hunting grounds, they will be willing to sell further 
tracts for small considerations.”38 
The legacy of this policy in the context of Indian Removal has been 
obscured, however, by a public narrative that has rendered such active 
decisionmaking as passive circumstance.39  In the judicial record, for 
example, Chief Justice Marshall, in his infamous 1823 opinion in  
Johnson v. M’Intosh,40 noted that colonial settlement had the effect of 
displacing the native peoples: “As the white population advanced, that 
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 33 Letter from General Philip Schuyler to the President of Congress (July 29, 1783) (on file with 
the National Archives, Washington, D.C.). 
 34 Letter from George Washington to James Duane (Sept. 7, 1783) (on file with the Library of 
Congress). 
 35 See STUART BANNER, HOW THE INDIANS LOST THEIR LAND 130–32 (2005).  
 36 Report of Henry Knox on the Northwestern Indians (June 15, 1789), in DOCUMENTS OF 
UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY 12, 12 (Francis Paul Prucha ed., 3d ed. 2000).  Conquering the 
Wabash, Knox estimated, would require an army of at least 2500 men and sums “far exceeding the 
ability of the United States to advance.”  Id. at 13. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 For an in-depth analysis of this narrative phenomenon, and more specifically of the construc-
tion of “replacement narratives” in New England during the colonial period and the period of the 
early Republic, see JEAN M. O’BRIEN, FIRSTING AND LASTING 55–104 (2010).  For an analysis 
of practices of discursive as well as material foreclosure that have characterized accounts of indig-
enous dispossession through the colonial economy, see K-Sue Park, Money, Mortgages, and the Con-
quest of America, 41 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1006 (2016). 
 40 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). 
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of the Indians necessarily receded.  The country in the immediate neigh-
bourhood of agriculturists became unfit for them.  The game fled into 
thicker and more unbroken forests, and the Indians followed.”41 
As I will show, however, the white population “advanced” only 
through a mighty coordinated legislative effort by colonists to make it 
impossible for indigenous communities to stay in their homelands.  The 
colonists’ obvious inability to forcibly remove native peoples during the 
early colonial period worked in their favor by giving their claims to seek 
peaceful coexistence with tribes some credibility.  However, as settlers 
grew in numbers, territory, and power, their increasing aggression against 
tribes threatened to provoke wars and jeopardize colonies’ indirect re-
moval and expansion projects.  As a result, from the early period, colo-
nial governments passed numerous preemption laws forbidding private 
purchases of native lands in an attempt to coordinate settlers’ actions 
with their own. 
As a background matter, the first settlers in America found their very 
arrival depopulated the lands.  Wherever settlers arrived, they spread 
diseases and caused epidemics with mortality rates that, because of in-
digenous people’s lack of immunity, frequently rose as high as eighty or 
ninety percent of a village’s population.42  Early settlers found the phe-
nomenon favorable to their colonization.43  The decimating effects of 
disease allowed many settlements in New England to find their foot-
holds without going to war with native inhabitants, or to quash bur-
geoning conflicts.44  Many indigenous people also “quickly learned that 
the new diseases could be escaped only by casting aside family and com-
munity ties and fleeing”; in the 1640s, Roger Williams observed that 
“[s]o terrible is their apprehension of an infectious disease that not only 
persons, but the Houses and the whole Towne takes flight.”45  Colonists 
built more than fifty early settlements on the sites of villages destroyed 
and vacated by disease.46 
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 41 Id. at 590–91. 
 42 WILLIAM CRONON, CHANGES IN THE LAND 86 (1983); Alfred W. Crosby, Virgin Soil  
Epidemics as a Factor in the Aboriginal Depopulation in America, 33 WM. & MARY Q. 289, 290 
(1976). 
 43 After a devastating epidemic among the Native Americans from 1616 through 1618, Plymouth 
colonists who came to settle in southern New England observed that there were “none to hinder 
our possession.”  NEAL SALISBURY, MANITOU AND PROVIDENCE 175 (1982); see also CRONON, 
supra note 42, at 87. 
 44 When colonists’ presence incited a “quarrell” with the Massachusett and Pawtucket “about 
their bounds of Land,” the arrival of several thousand settlers brought an epidemic that destroyed 
the conflict with the tribes.  SALISBURY, supra note 43, at 192. 
 45 CRONON, supra note 42, at 88. 
 46 Id. at 90.  Professor John Duffy described smallpox as a “dangerous ally” that “was frequently 
a decisive factor in the victories of the Europeans over the Indians.”  John Duffy, Smallpox and the 
Indians in the American Colonies, 25 BULL. HIST. MED. 324, 341 (1951).  U.S. Army medical officer 
Percy Moreau Ashburn similarly reflected that weapons, smallpox, and other eruptive fevers were 
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Colonists who pursued settlement as a policy sought to facilitate  
Europeans’ migration to America.47  However, as Professor Bernard 
Bailyn writes, “the actual organizing, supplying, shipping, and settling 
of people on the land was difficult and expensive, and hence risky.”48  
For settlers, overseas migration was also costly and arduous, and settle-
ment was fraught with risks of illness, starvation, and unnatural death.  
To recruit settlers, colonial authorities therefore promised them title to 
lands if they would occupy them.49  In the service of this policy, colonies 
gave away so much land that Senator Thomas Hart Benton described 
the thirteen colonies as having been “settled upon gratuitous donations, 
or nominal sales.”50  For decades, Virginia shareholders received fifty 
acres for every person they transported to the colony.51  Lord Baltimore 
promised every head of a household one hundred acres for settling in 
Maryland, one hundred more for bringing a wife and for each adult 
servant, and fifty acres for each child under sixteen years.52  Any  
adventurer who brought five men between the ages of sixteen and sixty 
received 2000 acres in 1633, 1000 acres in 1635, and 50 acres for each 
man in 1641.53  The Carolinas promised emigrating “undertakers” 100 
acres, 50 acres for each male servant, and 30 acres for each female serv-
ant.54  Georgia offered every immigrant fifty acres,55 and Massachusetts 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
“more effective, of greater range, of surer aim than any rifle or poison gas ever devised.”  P.M. 
ASHBURN, THE RANKS OF DEATH: A MEDICAL HISTORY OF THE CONQUEST OF AMERICA 
81 (Frank D. Ashburn ed., 1947). 
 47 Professor Aziz Rana also traces “this openness to European immigration” into the period of 
the early Republic.  See AZIZ RANA, THE TWO FACES OF AMERICAN FREEDOM 116 (2010).  
 48 BAILYN, supra note 30, at 81. 
 49 These challenges to emigration and the importance of the promise of land ownership contin-
ued to be factors in settlement into the period of the early Republic, as Professor James Pfander 
and Theresa Wardon observe in the context of their discussion of early U.S. naturalization policy.  
See James E. Pfander & Theresa R. Wardon, Reclaiming the Immigration Constitution of the Early 
Republic: Prospectivity, Uniformity, and Transparency, 96 VA. L. REV. 359, 365–66, 376–77 (2010).  
 50 1 THOMAS HART BENTON, THIRTY YEARS’ VIEW 106 (New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1854). 
 51 The Charter of 10th of Oct. 1676, in 2 THE STATUTES AT LARGE: BEING A COLLECTION 
OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA 532, 532 (New York, R. & W. & G. Bartow 1823) [hereinafter 
LAWS OF VIRGINIA]; Instructions to Governor Yeardley, 1618, in 2 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOG-
RAPHY 154, 157, 164 (1894).  In or around 1614, Governor Dale promised every man who brought 
a family to the Virginia colony a house with four rooms and twelve fenced acres adjacent to the 
house.  RALPH HAMOR, A TRUE DISCOURSE OF THE PRESENT ESTATE OF VIRGINIA 19 (Rich-
mond, Virginia State Library 1860). 
 52 Conditions of Plantations, 1636, in 3 PROCEEDINGS OF THE COUNCIL OF MARYLAND 
1636–1667, at 47, 47 (Baltimore, Maryland Historical Society 1885). 
 53 EUGENE IRVING MCCORMAC, WHITE SERVITUDE IN MARYLAND 13–15 (1904); Condi-
tions of Plantations, 1636, supra note 52, at 47–48, 99–100.  
 54 A Declaration and Proposals to All that Will Plant in Carolina (Aug. 25, 1663), in 1 COLO-
NIAL RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA 43, 45 (Raleigh, P.M. Hale 1886). 
 55 AN ACCOUNT SHOWING THE PROGRESS OF THE COLONY OF GEORGIA IN AMERICA, 
FROM ITS FIRST ESTABLISHMENT 6 (Annapolis, Jonas Green 1741). 
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Bay Company gave stockholders fifty acres for every person they  
transported.56 
While colonial governments were making regular overtures to tribes 
to attempt to maintain diplomatic relations, they simultaneously en-
gaged private citizens in the project of Indian Removal by linking set-
tlers’ private incentives to their own ends.  This strategy gave private 
individuals an inordinately large role to play in land acquisition and 
Indian Removal, which constituted a single project.  Colonial officials 
used legal rules to “channel[] settlement to maximize” the deleterious 
effects of settlers’ everyday lives on native peoples, which included not 
only spreading disease but also thinning game and destroying native 
peoples’ means of subsistence.57  Laws of settlement placed conditions 
on land bounties, including requirements that settlers occupy and  
“improve” the lands by building on them, clearing them, planting crops, 
and keeping stock, within a term of years.58  Colonists deforested the 
lands to build ships, houses, and furniture and to burn firewood, thereby 
exposing the soil and causing extreme temperatures, floods, and 
droughts.59  English mill dams obstructed indigenous peoples’ ability to 
fish.  English cows and pigs ate Indian crops and grass that animals 
indigenous to the territory had fed on.60  As a result of this range of 
activities, indigenous people who survived disease frequently could no 
longer find basic subsistence or stay in their homelands.  As Professor 
William Cronon has commented, “the Indians’ earlier way of interacting 
with their environment became impossible.”61 
Colonies also made larger grants to skilled laborers who established 
businesses in powder, printing, iron works, mining, salt works, and  
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 56 1 RECORDS OF THE GOVERNOR AND COMPANY OF THE MASSACHUSETTS BAY IN 
NEW ENGLAND 43 (Boston, W. White 1853). 
 57 Kades, supra note 32, at 1072. 
 58 Amelia Clewley Ford, Colonial Precedents of Our National Land System as It Existed in 
1800, 2 BULL. U. WIS. 323, 423 (1910).  In Virginia, for example, within three years, settlers had to 
build a house, plant one acre, and keep stock for one year, or the land would revert to the colony, 
Act XVIII, An Act for Seating and Planting, in 2 LAWS OF VIRGINIA, supra note 51, at 244, 244; 
later, settlers could not claim land entitlements unless they raised a crop of corn or resided on lands 
for one year, 2 REVISED CODE OF THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA 358 (n.p., 1819).  In Maine, for ex-
ample, settlers had to build a house of eighteen square feet and clear five to eight acres for mowing 
and tilling within three years.  2 WILLIAM D. WILLIAMSON, THE HISTORY OF THE STATE OF 
MAINE 180 (Hallowell, Glazier, Masters & Co. 1832). 
 59 CRONON, supra note 42, at 111–21 (“New England lumbering used forests as if they would 
last forever.”  Id. at 111.). 
 60 See VIRGINIA DEJOHN ANDERSON, CREATURES OF EMPIRE: HOW DOMESTIC  
ANIMALS TRANSFORMED EARLY AMERICA 221 (2004). 
 61 CRONON, supra note 42, at 15.  These factors led to the demise of white deer, elk, bear, lynx, 
beaver, otter, foxes, martens, minks, raccoons, and muskrats in New England.  Id. at 99, 101,  
105–07. 
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copper works.62  Colonial authorities especially rewarded settlers who 
promoted and governed settlements63 and who engaged in armed com-
bat.  In general, settlers arrived armed and ready to defend the lands 
they wished to claim.64  Many colonial laws required settlers to bear 
arms, even at church, and forbade selling arms to natives.  In 1646, 
Virginia granted 100 acres to the commander at Middle Plantation, and 
in 1679, it conditioned large land grants to military leaders on settling 
the land with 250 men, fifty of whom were to be well armed and always 
ready for conflict.65  Connecticut granted Captain John Mason 1000 
acres for serving in the Pequot massacre, whose survivors fled west to 
seek refuge with the Mohawks.66 
Though some communities simply fled disease, colonial officials also 
quickly learned that creating these new conditions made native people 
more likely to sell their land.  Indeed, colonists came to view this kind 
of devastation as a precondition to their ability to purchase lands.  In 
Tomlins’s words, their purchases of native land were always “larded 
with menaces.”67  As Professor Stuart Banner explains: “Repeated en-
croachment must have tipped Indians toward selling land they would 
not have otherwise sold, as a means of obtaining some recompense for 
a state of affairs they had great trouble preventing . . . .  Every increase 
in the English population gave the Indians more reason to sell their 
land.”68  By the eighteenth century, settlers were rapidly converting na-
tive “lands into commodities transferable out of the Indian community, 
creat[ing] the conditions for a vigorous land market that attracted  
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 62 For example, one man, for 3000 acres, covenanted to bring twenty people from England to 
Maryland who were “Artificers, Workmen, and other very useful persons.”  JOHN KILTY, THE 
LAND-HOLDER’S ASSISTANT, AND LAND-OFFICE GUIDE 79 (Baltimore, G. Dobin and Murphy 
1808).  Captain Thomas Barwick received at least 1200 acres in 1622 for bringing twenty-five ship-
wrights to Virginia to build houses, boats, and pinnaces.  ALEXANDER BROWN, THE FIRST  
REPUBLIC IN AMERICA 474 (Boston and New York, Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1898). 
 63 MELVILLE EGLESTON, THE LAND SYSTEM OF THE NEW ENGLAND COLONIES 20 
(Herbert B. Adams ed., Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University 1886).  
 64 Ford, supra note 58, at 423–24 (“The policy gradually developed of using military bounties to 
promote compact settlement on the frontier by men able to defend it, and in this way to secure 
protection without the expense of a standing army.”).  Professor Wendy Warren recently made a 
similar argument by pointing out that Plymouth, like other early settlements, was a garrison.  See 
WENDY WARREN, NEW ENGLAND BOUND 84 (2016). 
 65 LYON GARDINER TYLER, WILLIAMSBURG, THE OLD COLONIAL CAPITAL 12 (1907); An 
Act Enabling Major Laurence Smith and Capt. William Bird to Seate Certaine Lands at the Head 
of Rappahannock and James River, in 2 LAWS OF VIRGINIA, supra note 51, at 448, 452–53. 
 66 See J. HAMMOND TRUMBULL, 1 THE PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF  
CONNECTICUT PRIOR TO THE UNION WITH NEW HAVEN COLONY 208 (Hartford, Brown & 
Parsons 1850); NEW ENGLAND HISTORICAL AND GENEALOGICAL REGISTER 345 (1943). 
 67 TOMLINS, supra note 31, at 151. 
 68 BANNER, supra note 35, at 54. 
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English speculators and new English residents into the community.”69  
Meanwhile, landless native people who remained within a growing set-
tler society could find only menial work, frequently became entrapped 
in debtor-creditor relationships and indentured servitude, and lost their 
children to English guardians, who claimed expenses that increased na-
tive debt, forcing them to sell remaining lands to pay.70  Native people 
who wished to challenge any of this faced a costly, biased, and English-
controlled legal system.  Colonies’ Black Codes further restricted the 
mobility of nonwhites, including natives, through curfews, which pro-
hibited travel and gatherings.71 
In many colonies, individuals and groups of private citizens, as well 
as colonial officials, purchased lands directly from native people.   
Indeed, a talent for acquiring native lands through negotiation,  
purchase, or war frequently propelled individual settlers into governing 
positions in the colonies.72  However, settlers’ steady encroachment onto 
and dispossession of native lands generated conflicts with tribes that 
both erupted into bloody wars and raised the constant threat of war.73  
In an effort to reduce the instances of war, nearly every colony therefore 
passed laws prohibiting trespass and waste on native lands, as well as 
private purchases of native lands without official order or leave of a 
court.  These laws first appeared in the 1630s in Massachusetts Bay 
Colony and Maryland74 and continued to proliferate through the end of 
the seventeenth century.75  Some laws preempted private purchases by 
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 69 JEAN M. O’BRIEN, DISPOSSESSION BY DEGREES 170 (1997); see also id. at 151 (“[T]he 
individualization of landownership that made a land market possible constituted the most signifi-
cant structural alteration in the Indian community in the eighteenth century.”). 
 70 Id. at 132–33. 
 71 Colonies applied laws to subordinate free blacks to mixed race and native persons as well.  
The examples are too numerous to list, but for a sample of such laws in several colonies, see JOHN 
B. DILLON, ODDITIES OF COLONIAL LEGISLATION IN AMERICA 203–42 (Indianapolis, Robert 
Douglass 1879).  For a succinct description of such laws in Massachusetts Bay, see YASUHIDE 
KAWASHIMA, PURITAN JUSTICE AND THE INDIAN 206–16 (1986). 
 72 JOHN FREDERICK MARTIN, PROFITS IN THE WILDERNESS 18 (1991). 
 73 For example, the Anglo-Powhatan Wars, Kieft’s War, Metacom’s War, the Susquehannock 
War, the Yamasee War, Father Rale’s War, and others. 
 74 Mass. Bay: Law to Prohibit Unauthorized Purchase of Indian Land (Mar. 4, 1634), reprinted 
in 17 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS: TREATIES AND LAWS, 1607–1789, at 81 (Alden 
T. Vaughan & Deborah A. Rosen eds., 2004) [hereinafter EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCU-
MENTS]; Laws Concerning Indians in Code of 1648, reprinted in 17 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN 
DOCUMENTS, supra, at 102 (codifying 1634 law); Md.: Law to Regulate Land Purchases (Feb. 25–
Mar. 19, 1639), reprinted in 15 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra, at 259. 
 75 See, e.g., N.Y.: Law to Prevent Trespasses on Indian Lands (May 9, 1640), reprinted in 17 
EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 74, at 493; N.H.: Order to Regulate  
Purchase of Indian Lands (Feb. 3, 1641), reprinted in 17 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCU-
MENTS, supra note 74, at 22; Plymouth: Law to Protect Indians’ Land and Timber (June 6, 1643), 
reprinted in 17 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 74, at 13; New Haven: Law 
to Prohibit Unauthorized Acquisition of Land (Feb. 24, 1645), reprinted in 17 EARLY AMERICAN  
INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 74, at 395; Law to Prevent Individual Purchases of Land (Jan. 
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delegating purchasing power to townships and specific counties;76 as 
time went on, colonies passed laws increasing the penalties for viola-
tions, in an effort to send a message to tribes as much as to settlers 
themselves.77 
The acceleration of land appropriation and removal in the eighteenth 
century intensified settler-native conflicts and made the threat of war 
omnipresent,78 spurring a concerted attempt by colonies to preempt  
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4, 1640), reprinted in 17 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 74, at 393; Va.: 
Law to Preserve Indian Territory (Oct. 10, 1649), reprinted in 15 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOC-
UMENTS, supra note 74, at 41–42; Law to Christianize Indians and Regulate Land Sales (Mar. 10, 
1656), reprinted in 15 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 74, at 47–48; Law to 
Protect Indians’ Land (Nov. 25, 1652), reprinted in 15 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, 
supra note 74, at 43–44; Conn.: Law to Prohibit Taking Indians’ Property (Oct. 4, 1660), reprinted 
in 17 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 74, at 280; Law to Prohibit Acquisi-
tion of Indian Land for Private Use (May 14, 1663), reprinted in 17 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN 
DOCUMENTS, supra note 74, at 282 (“[N]o person in this Colony shall buy, hire or receive as a gift 
or mortgage, any parcel of land or lands of any Indian or Indians, for the future, except . . . with 
the allowance of the Court.”); N.J.: Law to Acquire Land from Indians in West New Jersey (May 
2–15, 1683), reprinted in 17 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 74, at 668; Law 
to Require Permission to Buy Indian Lands (Sept. 8, 1683), reprinted in 17 EARLY AMERICAN 
INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 74, at 668; N.H.: Law to Regulate Purchase of Indian Lands 
(June 1, 1687), reprinted in 17 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 74, at 227; 
N.Y.: Law to Regulate Purchase of Indian Lands (Oct. 23, 1684), reprinted in 17 EARLY AMERI-
CAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 74, at 530; Pa.: Law to Regulate Purchases of Land from 
Indians (Mar. 10, 1683), reprinted in 17 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 74, 
at 733; Law to Nullify Unauthorized Land Purchases (Nov. 27, 1700), reprinted in 17 EARLY 
AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 74, at 735. 
 76 See, e.g., Conn.: Law to Clarify Purchase of Indian Lands (Oct. 8–14, 1702), reprinted in 17 
EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 74, at 318; Va.: Law to Allow Northampton 
County to Purchase Indian Lands (Nov. 20, 1654), reprinted in 15 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN 
DOCUMENTS, supra note 74, at 46–47. 
 77 See, e.g., R.I.: Law to Regulate Purchase of Indian Lands (Nov. 4, 1651), reprinted in 17 
EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 74, at 420; Law to Prohibit Unauthorized 
Land Purchases (Nov. 2, 1658), reprinted in 17 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra 
note 74, at 423; Law to Prevent Illegal Purchases of Indian Land (Oct. 25, 1727), reprinted in 17 
EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 74, at 459; Mass. Bay: Order to Regulate 
Land Purchases (June 1, 1687), reprinted in 17 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra 
note 74, at 143; Conn.: Law to Prohibit Purchase of Indian Lands (May 17, 1680), reprinted in 17 
EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 74, at 311; Law to Regulate Purchase of 
Indian Lands (June 1, 1687), reprinted in 17 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra 
note 74, at 314; Law to Regulate Purchase of Indian Lands (Oct. 11, 1722), reprinted in 17 EARLY 
AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 74, at 340; N.J.: Law to Regulate Purchases of 
Indian Lands (Dec. 13, 1703), reprinted in 17 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra 
note 74, at 678; N.H.: Law to Regulate Purchases of Land from Indians (May 2, 1719), reprinted in 
17 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 74, at 235. 
 78 Military leaders drew from some of the lessons of settlement.  In 1763, Captain Simeon Ecuyer 
famously sought to “exterminate[]” the Delawares at “one single stroke” by giving two Delaware leaders 
infected blankets and handkerchiefs; a receipt initialed by top British brass noted that the purpose was 
“to Convey the Smallpox to the Indians.”  GREGORY EVANS DOWD, WAR UNDER HEAVEN 190 
(2002); see also FRANK FENNER ET AL., SMALLPOX AND ITS ERADICATION 239 (1989). 
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private purchase of native lands.79  Nonetheless, the colonies both em-
broiled themselves in quarrels with one another and collectively brought 
settler-tribal relations to the brink of a general war.  In a bid to reassert 
control of the colonization effort and reassure tribes of the Crown’s good 
will, King George III issued the Royal Proclamation of 1763.  The Proc-
lamation forbade all settlement west of a boundary line drawn along the 
Appalachian Mountains and preempted both private purchases and co-
lonial officials’ power to grant lands.80 
Settlers’ aggression so exposed the colonial goal of removal that it 
jeopardized colonies’ relations with one another and threatened colonial 
officials’ ability to maintain diplomatic ties with tribes.  In other words, 
private individuals’ hunger for land threatened to destroy the alignment 
between private interests and official interests in maintaining control of 
the territory by avoiding war.  Colonies therefore preempted private 
purchases of native lands in an attempt to coordinate removal policy.  
The Crown — similarly wary of colonial governments’ ability to avoid 
war with native nations or one another — took a similar approach with 
its Proclamation.  Colonists’ resounding rejection of this attempt to re-
strain their land acquisition, however, culminated in the Revolution, 
bringing the history of removal to its next chapter.  As I will show in 
the next section, the model through which private citizens had sought 
to recursively realize the Lockean ideal of “vacant lands” by causing 
native people to remove themselves became the prototype for removal 
in the new nation.81  Further, despite the unpopularity of the Proclama-
tion, the principle of preemption both preceded and survived it to struc-
ture land and removal policy in the United States.82 
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 79 See, e.g., Pa.: Law to Regulate Purchases of Land from Indians (Feb. 14, 1730), reprinted 
in 17 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 74, at 755; S.C.: Law to Prevent Pur-
chase of Indian Lands (Dec. 18, 1739), reprinted in 16 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, 
supra note 74, at 295–96; Ga.: Law to Regulate Purchase of Land from Indians (Feb. 15, 1758), 
reprinted in 16 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 74, at 406; Md.: Law to 
Determine Indian-English Controversies (May 1, 1756), reprinted in 15 EARLY AMERICAN  
INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 74, at 339; Va.: Law to Prevent the Dispossession of Indians 
(Feb. 27, 1752), reprinted in 15 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 74, at 195. 
 80 In the following years, Pennsylvania passed laws imposing punishments for violations of the 
Proclamation that included “death without the benefit of clergy,” imprisonment, and a £500 fine.  
Law to Proscribe Settlement on Indian Lands (Feb. 3, 1768), reprinted in 17 EARLY AMERICAN 
INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 74, at 781; Law to Amend Prohibition Against Settling on Indian 
Lands (Feb. 18, 1769), reprinted in 17 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 74, 
at 785. 
 81 See generally Robert Nichols, Theft Is Property! The Recursive Logic of Dispossession, 46 
POL. THEORY 3 (2017). 
 82 For a fuller elaboration of this argument, see Robert N. Clinton, The Proclamation of 1763: 
Colonial Prelude to Two Centuries of Federal-State Conflict over the Management of Indian Affairs, 
69 B.U. L. REV. 329 (1989). 
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B.  U.S. Removal Policy During the Early Republic 
Despite the outrage inspired by the Proclamation of 1763, the United 
States recognized immediately after its founding the necessity of having 
a mechanism for coordinating removal policy.  Early on, it therefore 
incorporated preemption provisions that mirrored those of the hated 
Proclamation into its own land and removal policy.  Before long, these 
constraints provoked states to attempt to create their own independent 
self-deportation regimes by legislating public discrimination.  As in the 
colonies, this subfederal legislation misaligned state and federal interests, 
and though it drew on indirect principles — attacking every aspect of 
native peoples’ lives — it made the removal aim overt and the tactic of 
discrimination painfully clear.  Moreover, the limited scope of these laws 
promised spillover effects that risked further destabilizing interstate re-
lations.  Perhaps for all these reasons, federal courts struck this legisla-
tion down.  This section examines the development of the preemption 
principle in removal federalism in the context of debates about self-de-
portation and mass deportation in the early Republic.  It shows how the 
nation’s experience with Indian Removal shaped its anticipation of and 
responses to abolition: the Fourteenth Amendment, for example,  
codified the courts’ prohibition on public discrimination and affirmed  
subordination as the purview of private citizens.  Emancipation also set 
the stage for the next chapter of removal history by sparking a search 
for new sources of cheap labor and new ways of controlling it.  Abolition 
shifted the property interests driving removal policy from land acquisi-
tion to control of labor. 
1.  Indian Removal in the United States: The Coordinating Function 
of Preemption in Self-Deportation Policy. — In its first decades, the 
federal government continued to pursue Indian Removal principally 
through a combination of indirect methods and outright warfare, as the 
colonies had done for two centuries.83  Soon after the formation of the 
United States, the federal government also asserted control over the land 
market to try to keep the states from going to war with each other and 
with tribes.84  It preempted the direct purchase of tribal land by any 
entity other than itself, creating a centralized structure through which it 
coordinated national removal policy.85  As a result, the new states could 
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 83 In a trend so broad that it is not useful to single out any scholar as an example, the literature 
frequently employs the term “Indian Removal” to refer to direct removals, rather than self-depor-
tation.  However, Banner presents an exception to this rule when he observes, “If the 1830s were 
an era of removal, so too were the previous two centuries,” for “most of the features of U.S. government 
policy that are conventionally thought to make up Indian removal were nothing new.”  BANNER, supra 
note 35, at 192. 
 84 For a detailed account of how the United States came to consolidate federal power in the area 
of land policy and Indian affairs during the period of the ratification of the Constitution, see  
Gregory Ablavsky, The Savage Constitution, 63 DUKE L.J. 999, 1038–50 (2014). 
 85 Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790, ch. 33, § 4, 1 Stat. 137, 138 (codified as amended at 25 
U.S.C. § 177 (1982)). 
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not purchase lands from tribes who remained within their territorial 
boundaries, nor, therefore, remove them.  In theory at least, they had to 
wait for the federal government to act.  States’ impatience with and 
challenges to the federal government’s preemptive power sparked the 
first federalism disputes in the field of removal and culminated in the 
only mass deportations, in a strict sense, in the nation’s history. 
New circumstances in the United States whetted both the federal 
and state appetites for a faster, more aggressive means of land acquisi-
tion and removal.  The federal government urgently desired to take pos-
session of the lands the British had surrendered to it under the Treaty 
of Paris to pay off its considerable war debt.  Meanwhile, many eastern 
states had taken possession of sufficient lands that they sought to claim 
total jurisdiction within their territorial boundaries.86  Federal and state 
governments as well as private entities all continued to encourage set-
tlement on native lands and, thus, ensured that private individuals 
would continue to play a major role in Indian Removal.  Congress made 
a series of early land grants to settlers who would defend against imme-
diate “threats,” especially along contested borders in the Mississippi, 
Louisiana, Missouri, and Michigan Territories.87  Even before the war 
had ended, new states including Virginia, North Carolina, and  
Massachusetts adopted systems of free land grants, and states with large 
backcountry regions, such as Pennsylvania, Minnesota, and Wisconsin, 
continued to recruit settlers from the East Coast and Europe for the next 
century,88 like the federal government.89 
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 86 See BANNER, supra note 35, at 147 (“Americans now wanted to obtain the Indians’ land 
more quickly, too quickly for the old method of patient, parcel-by-parcel purchasing.  There were 
now too many emigrants to the west, and too much need for the federal revenue the land promised 
to bring in, to wait for the game to be driven away.”). 
 87 See, e.g., Act of Mar. 3, 1807, ch. 34, § 2, 2 Stat. 437 (regulating grants of land in Michigan 
Territory); Act of Mar. 27, 1804, ch. 61, § 13, 2 Stat. 303 (regulating grants of land in Louisiana 
Territory, present day Missouri); Act of Mar. 3, 1803, ch. 27, § 17, 2 Stat. 229 (disposing of land in 
Mississippi Territory); Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 27, 1 Stat. 221 (giving 400 acres to individuals who 
were “heads of families at Vincennes or in the Illinois country” as of 1783); Letter from President George 
Washington to Congress (Dec. 23, 1790), in ANNALS OF CONGRESS 1826 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). 
 88 EDITH ABBOTT, HISTORICAL ASPECTS OF THE IMMIGRATION PROBLEM 129–32, 167–
72, 732–33 (1926) (collecting documents describing state efforts to recruit settlers). 
 89 In the nineteenth century, the federal government continued to pass legislation to subsidize 
land and lure settlers to territory still under native control, including the Armed Occupation Act of 
1842, ch. 122, 5 Stat. 502; the Homestead Act of 1862, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392; the Southern Homestead 
Act of 1866, ch. 127, 14 Stat. 66; and the Timber Culture Act of 1873, ch. 277, 17 Stat. 605.  Settlers 
also continued to spread disease that greatly afflicted tribes across the West.  See, e.g., JEFFREY 
OSTLER, THE PLAINS SIOUX AND U.S. COLONIALISM FROM LEWIS AND CLARK TO 
WOUNDED KNEE 31, 33 (2004); Crosby, supra note 42, at 290–91 (describing epidemics in the 
1820s and 1830s).  Settler-native wars reached their height during this period, and the army used 
techniques from settlement in these wars, including destroying central plains tribes’ main source of 
food — the buffalo.  RICHARD WHITE, “IT’S YOUR MISFORTUNE AND NONE OF MY OWN”: A 
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WEST 219 (1991). 
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While states tried to use this power by more thickly settling their 
lands, and though the white and black settler population in Georgia, for 
example, almost doubled between 1790 and 1800, and again from 1800 
to 1820, the Creeks and Cherokees refused to leave.90  Federal officials 
“discussed speeding up the process of dispossession,” but as Professor 
Paul Frymer notes, for a few decades, they “remained content to move 
people via individual treaties and voluntary emigration, efforts that 
slowly but exhaustively removed Indian title and communities from 
lands east of the Mississippi.”91  After its purchase of 530 million acres 
west of the Mississippi in 1803, Congress authorized the President to 
promise eastern tribes western lands if they would relinquish their 
own,92 furnishing the Executive with a new removal tool that overcame 
a limitation of self-deportation policy — people’s inability to leave with-
out somewhere else to go.  The government also agreed to cover  
relocation costs if a tribe would agree to remove.  Consequently, thou-
sands of Cherokee moved west of the Mississippi before 1820;93 between 
1817 and 1821, some Cherokees, Shawnees, Delawares, and Kickapoos 
agreed to ten such exchanges of western for eastern lands.94  Through 
the 1820s, the government continued to apply pressure on many tribes, 
many of whose members, including Oneidas, Kickapoos, Choctaws, and 
Creeks, continued to cede their land to the United States.95  Still, in 
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 90 BANNER, supra note 35, at 195. 
 91 PAUL FRYMER, BUILDING AN AMERICAN EMPIRE 114 (2017); see also 2 AMERICAN 
STATE PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS 123–24 (Walter Lowrie & Walter S. Franklin eds., 1834) [here-
inafter AMERICAN STATE PAPERS] (describing Senate proceedings from 1817 regarding land ex-
changes with tribes); Ronald N. Satz, The Cherokee Trail of Tears: A Sesquicentennial Perspective, 
73 GA. HIST. Q. 431 (1989).  From 1800–1830, the federal government engaged in ninety-one trans-
actions to purchase lands from weary tribes; between 1795 and 1838, the federal government spent 
more than $80 million to purchase 419.4 million acres of land from tribes.  INDIANS REMOVED 
TO WEST MISSISSIPPI FROM 1789, H.R. Doc. No. 25-147 (1839). 
 92 2 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra note 91, at 124–25. 
 93 Id.; see also STANLEY W. HOIG, THE CHEROKEES AND THEIR CHIEFS 104 (1998); Letter 
from Joseph McMinn, Governor, Tenn., to Daniel Graham, Sec’y of State, United States (Oct. 1, 
1818), SOUTHEASTERN NATIVE AMERICAN DOCUMENTS 1730–1842, http://neptune3.galib. 
uga.edu/ssp/cgi-bin/tei-natamer-idx.pl?sessionid=7f000001&type=doc&tei2id=GML007 [https://perma. 
cc/E2ZX-6WQA]; Letter from Joseph McMinn, Governor, Tenn., to Daniel Graham, Sec’y of State, 
United States (Nov. 19, 1818), SOUTHEASTERN NATIVE AMERICAN DOCUMENTS 1730–1842, 
http://neptune3.galib.uga.edu/ssp/cgi-bin/tei-natamer-idx.pl?sessionid=7f000001&type=doc&tei2id= 
GML011 [https://perma.cc/7VKR-BCK6]; Letter from Joseph McMinn, Governor, Tenn., to Daniel 
Graham, Sec’y of State, United States (Dec. 11, 1818), SOUTHEASTERN NATIVE AMERICAN 
DOCUMENTS 1730–1842, http://neptune3.galib.uga.edu/ssp/cgi-bin/tei-natamer-idx.pl?sessionid= 
7f000001&type=doc&tei2id=GML010 [https://perma.cc/4P8W-9Q4U] (also available at the Tennessee 
State Library and Archives, Governor McMinn Letters, Box 10, folder 53). 
 94 BANNER, supra note 35, at 194.  
 95 See, e.g., Treaty with the Creeks, Jan. 18, 1821, 7 Stat. 215; MICHAEL D. GREEN, THE POL-
ITICS OF INDIAN REMOVAL 69–141 (1982) (describing the experiences of the Creeks during this 
time period); Creek Indians, 22 NILES’ WEEKLY REGISTER 223 (1824); Letter from Duncan 
Campbell and James Meriwether, Comm’rs, United States, to Creek Chiefs (Dec. 9, 1824),  
SOUTHEASTERN NATIVE AMERICAN DOCUMENTS 1730–1842, http://neptune3.galib.uga.edu/ 
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1825, the War Department estimated that nearly 54,000 native people, 
including Cherokees, Choctaws, and Creeks, continued to live within the 
boundaries of Georgia, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, and New 
York.96  The Cherokees still held 5.3 million acres of fertile land in Geor-
gia and over a million in Tennessee, while the Creeks held well over 4 
million in Georgia and the Choctaw and the Chickasaw held over 15.7 
million in Mississippi.97 
In the late 1820s, impatient southeastern states responded to what 
they perceived as federal inaction with respect to the issue of Indian 
Removal.  Presaging the subfederal self-deportation legislation of the 
twentieth and twenty-first centuries, they began to pass legislation that 
asserted states’ rights to initiate indirect removal processes.98  The  
Georgia legislature led this effort with a series of “extension laws” that 
sought to subordinate the Cherokee and establish jurisdiction over all 
the lands within the state’s boundaries.  First, in 1827, Georgia assigned 
Cherokee land to various Georgia counties, denying Cherokee sover-
eignty and subjecting Cherokees to the state’s jurisdiction and laws.  In 
1828, it formally declared Cherokee laws void within the state.  In 1830, 
it first authorized the state to take possession of all Cherokee gold, silver, 
and other mines, and then to seize all Cherokee land and distribute it to 
white settlers.  It made it illegal for Cherokees to assemble for any pur-
pose and voided contracts into which they entered.99  Governor George 
Gilmer acknowledged these laws “were produced for the sole purpose of 
making life so miserable for the Cherokees that they would be forced to 
remove,” privately echoing the purpose the legislature had openly de-
clared in 1829.100  Secretary of War John Eaton argued the laws were 
“legitimate powers which attach, and belong to [the states’] sovereign 
character.”101 
Despite technically deploying indirect strategies of removal by  
attacking Cherokee lives, the extension laws’ explicit goals of removal 
and control of Cherokee lands raised the public debate over this indirect 
policy to a feverish pitch.  A famous legal battle ensued in which the 
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ssp/cgi-bin/tei-natamer-idx.pl?sessionid=7f000001&type=doc&tei2id=tcc008 [https://perma.cc/K5CX- 
XSZY] (also available at the Hargrett Rare Book and Manuscript Library, University of Georgia 
Libraries, Telamon Cuyler collection, Box 77, folder 33). 
 96 1 Reg. Deb. app. 63 (1825). 
 97 Id. at app. 61. 
 98 As Banner comments, “[i]t was only a matter of time before frontier state governments, an-
swerable to white settlers bordering on Indian land, began ratcheting up the pressure on the non-
selling tribes by threatening to make life considerably more difficult for Indians who refused to sell 
their land.”  BANNER, supra note 35, at 213. 
 99 BANNER, supra note 35, at 201; see also FRYMER, supra note 91, at 116 (describing a January 
1828 Georgia resolution asserting title over tribal land within its state boundaries).  
 100 GARRISON, supra note 13, at 107. 
 101 Letter from John H. Eaton, Sec’y of War, United States, to Cherokee Delegation (Apr. 18, 
1829), in DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY, supra note 36, at 44, 46. 
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Supreme Court ultimately rejected these overt self-deportation laws and 
refused to allow states to legislate public discrimination in this way.102  
Although the Court affirmed inherent tribal sovereignty in Worcester v. 
Georgia103 by asserting the federal government’s supremacy in the realm 
of Indian Affairs, the Court also guaranteed the government’s preroga-
tive to coordinate the national removal effort.104  Further, the other 
branches of the federal government generally acquiesced in the south-
eastern states’ informal refusal to abide by the Court’s holding limiting 
their jurisdiction in Worcester.  Because these states’ courts went on to 
assert their jurisdiction in dozens of criminal cases with Indian  
defendants, Professor Tim Garrison concludes that state supreme courts 
effectively “displaced the Supreme Court’s decision,” making “southern 
removal ideology . . . the law of the land.”105  Observing the effects of 
federal and state nonenforcement, Professor Deborah Rosen comments 
that “[t]he federal government and the state governments shared an end 
goal, and they acted in tandem to achieve that goal”106: “control of In-
dians and Indian lands.”107 
This convergence between state and federal interests came into stark 
relief in the federal government’s choice to exercise its supremacy in this 
realm to pursue a mass deportation plan.  After the election of Andrew 
Jackson, Congress passed the Indian Removal Act of 1830,108 which  
appropriated $500,000 for the direct removal of tribes.109  This Act, by 
making the threat of mass deportation imminent,110 had immediate in-
direct effects: its passage spurred more tribes to enter into treaties to 
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 102 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832).  In 1831, the Supreme Court punted on 
deciding the constitutionality of Georgia’s extension laws, but by declining jurisdiction, it limited 
Cherokee sovereignty by declaring the Cherokee Nation a “domestic dependent nation[]” rather 
than a “foreign state[].”  Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 13 (1831).  By describing 
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 105 GARRISON, supra note 13, at 229. 
 106 ROSEN, supra note 15, at 78. 
 107 Id. at 78–79. 
 108 Ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411 (1830). 
 109 Id. at 412. 
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exchange their lands, beginning with the Choctaw in 1830.111  Still, the 
Cherokee refused to leave, and in 1835, U.S. statesmen negotiated and 
ratified with a minority coalition a treaty requiring the tribe to depart, 
though Cherokee leaders objected that the treaty was fraudulent.112 
In March 1836, more than two-thirds of the peoples targeted for re-
moval remained on their lands.113  President Jackson authorized 10,000 
volunteer troops to deport them,114 and in 1838, the U.S. Army interned 
the Cherokee in Georgia in forts to await mass expulsion.115  The War 
Department, woefully and predictably short on funds, allowed Georgia 
to assist with the deportation effort by directing the troops and  
requested an additional $1.1 million from Congress.116  The mass depor-
tation of over 18,000 Cherokee across several hundred miles was an  
administrative and humanitarian disaster.  Between 4000 and 8000 
Cherokee died.  Many more suffered from dysentery, cholera, malnutri-
tion, and exposure as they walked across the frozen ground and the  
Mississippi river.117 
Beyond rooting the removal system in indirect strategies, Indian  
Removal also served as a testing ground through which the U.S. gov-
ernment developed a coordinated indirect removal policy and flexed its 
newfound power to experiment with direct mass removal.  Critically, it 
coordinated its own removal efforts with those of states by prohibiting 
states from legislating public discrimination.  By permitting states to 
continue recruiting settlers who would engage in hostilities and  
discrimination on the ground, however, the federal government contin-
ued to delegate the work of subordination to the private sphere instead.  
From its evolving seat of power, it further undertook the mass deporta-
tion of eastern tribes and, there, allowed states to play a supporting role.  
This decision highlights an important limitation of self-deportation 
strategy: while potent enough to have facilitated the establishment of 
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the United States, the policy left the government with little control over 
removal and no ability to force final land cessions from tribes.118  In a 
catastrophic experiment that it would not repeat, the federal govern-
ment therefore used direct removal methods to supplement and fill in 
the gaps of its indirect policy of self-deportation, rather than the reverse. 
2.  Black Colonization Plans and Their Aftermath: Subordination as 
the Domain of the Private Sphere in Self-Deportation Policy. — The 
more land colonists sought, the more they relied upon the African slave 
trade to procure labor that would give productive value to the lands 
they expropriated.  From an early period, therefore, the growing number 
of civic and racial outsiders in colonial society concerned white settlers, 
who considered mass deporting the increasing numbers of free blacks in 
colonial society.119  After the establishment of the United States, the 
specter of abolition only intensified these debates.120  Legislators 
brought their experience with Indian Removal to bear on their debates 
over the options of mass deporting and self-deporting emancipated 
slaves.121  Indeed, the expense and logistical difficulties of mass depor-
tation in Indian Removal perhaps explain why a national “black  
colonization” effort, as these mass deportation plans were called, never 
came to pass.  Consistent with its anticipation of abolition, the nation’s 
experience with removal marked the developments that followed it.  
Perhaps most importantly, the government consecrated the prohibition 
on public discrimination in the Fourteenth Amendment while sanction-
ing private discrimination.  This new federal constraint sparked conflict 
with southern states, which sought immediately to legally subordinate 
free blacks.  It also paved the way for indirect removal policy — with 
its heavy structural reliance on private discrimination — to answer the 
post–Civil War need for new methods of controlling new sources of 
cheap, increasingly foreign labor. 
Between 1770 and 1810, most statesmen opposed slavery for various 
reasons.  But they would not seriously consider emancipation because 
they could not imagine integrating blacks into the national polity.  White 
northerners wished to ensure that blacks would stay in the South, and 
white southerners would not contemplate civic equality.  These factors, 
together with the daunting expense and logistics of a mass expulsion, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 118 FRYMER, supra note 91, at 114. 
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long stymied efforts during the early Republic to imagine a concrete end 
to slavery.122  In 1790, the black population of Delaware, Maryland, 
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia comprised be-
tween 36% and 44% of the total population.123  In many counties and 
districts, blacks outnumbered whites.  During the constitutional ratifi-
cation process, James Galloway of North Carolina had commented that 
“[i]t is impossible for us to be happy, if, after manumission, they are to 
stay among us.”124 
States and statesmen therefore long deliberated over the individual125 
and mass deportation of free blacks.  In particular, the question of where 
to send deportees preoccupied proponents of black colonization plans, 
but to no resolution.  As President, Thomas Jefferson considered but 
rejected western lands in the United States, the West Indies, Santo  
Domingo, and Sierra Leone as destinations for both black and Indian 
deportees.126  More than a dozen state and local legislatures pleaded 
with Congress for aid for black colonization in 1827 and 1828, but  
Senate Committee members worried that “taking land in Africa required 
a new conquest unlike the manner by which the United States extin-
guished Indian lands” and estimated that the costs of transportation 
alone would amount to more than $28 million.127  Legislators from  
Delaware described mass deportation as “essential to our safety” and a 
“necessity of self-defense.”128  As Frymer recounts, Maryland allocated 
$200,000 for mass deportation in 1832, authorized the establishment of 
a colony at Cape Palmas, and later offered blacks free passage to Liberia 
or Trinidad.129  Indeed, Frederick Douglass remarked that “almost every 
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 122 Civil rights attorney Don B. Kates, Jr. sought to explain the conundrum they faced as follows: 
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respectable man” in the north was in favor of black colonization.130  By 
the 1840s, Frymer tells us, eleven northern state legislatures had for-
mally endorsed black colonization.131 
Meanwhile, Southern politicians vehemently opposed abolition and 
black colonization together, viewing the latter as an attack on slavery.  
Publically, many opposed such plans on the grounds of cost and logisti-
cal impossibility.  Patrick Henry, for example, lamented that “to re-ex-
port them is impracticable, and sorry I am for it.”132  Virginia  
abolitionist Judge St. George Tucker believed that a “marked physical 
and intellectual inferiority” required the removal of blacks after eman-
cipation, but “heaped scorn” on plans calling for “deportation at govern-
ment expense.”133  The cost would be prohibitive, he argued; if Virginia 
suffered from the tax burden of providing for three or four thousand 
soldiers in the west during the Revolution, how could it possibly pay to 
deport 305,000 freedmen in Virginia, or the 800,000 freedmen in all the 
slaveholding states?134  Tucker therefore proposed Virginia use a self-
deportation strategy instead, to achieve the outcome of removal without 
the expense of deportation: the state should, “by denying them those 
privileges here which they might hope to acquire elsewhere, endeavour 
to prompt them to migrate from hence.”135  Practically, this plan meant 
laws that would disarm blacks and exclude them from office; and “by 
incapacitating them from holding lands, we should add one inducement 
more to emigration and effectually remove the foundation of ambition, 
and party struggle.”136  “Under such an arrangement,” he mused, “we 
might reasonably hope, that time would remove from us a race of men, 
whom we wish not to incorporate with us, which now form an obstacle 
to such incorporation.”137 
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As nationwide emancipation loomed closer, the challenges of directly 
removing more than four million African Americans concretized the  
untenability of their mass deportation.138  As late as 1862, President 
Abraham Lincoln urged Congress to adopt a colonization plan and ac-
quire the territory to carry it out.139  Many northern states had already 
passed explicit “stay out” laws.140  As early as 1848, Illinois prohibited 
“Negro immigration” entirely in its constitution,141 and Oregon,  
California, Illinois, Indiana, and Iowa also passed constitutions prohib-
iting the settlement of blacks.142  Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, New Jer-
sey, Indiana, and Ohio all enacted legislation making it practically  
impossible for free blacks to live within their boundaries.143  Virtually 
all northern states embraced self-deportation policies of the “stay out” 
variety at this time. 
White southerners, for their part, responded to abolition and the fail-
ure of black colonization by seeking new means of legally subordinating 
the free black population.  Almost immediately, southern states began 
to pass Black Codes that targeted every aspect of black people’s lives to 
differentiate them from whites144 and attempt to control black people’s 
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labor through employment laws, criminal laws,145 and the vast expan-
sion of the convict lease system and public works projects.146  The fed-
eral government responded to these laws and their bald attempts to un-
dermine the outcome of the war by asserting federal prerogative to 
prohibit such public discrimination, now to protect the formal equality 
of all U.S. citizens.  Congress first asserted this prohibition by passing 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 over President Andrew Johnson’s veto,147 
and then enshrined the principle in the Fourteenth Amendment.148  The 
Fourteenth Amendment importantly prohibited states from abridging 
the “privileges or immunities” of U.S. citizens or depriving them of due 
process and equal protection of the laws.149  This emphasis on official 
action and general permission of private discrimination eventually hard-
ened into the famous state action doctrine, according to which the  
Constitution does not tolerate discrimination committed by a  
government entity, but places no prohibition on discrimination by  
private citizens.150 
This federal constraint sparked new conflicts between the federal 
government and the states whose power it checked.  Reconstruction  
efforts went into demise after the federal commitment to protect them 
ended with President Rutherford Hayes’s pledge to respect “local  
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autonomy” and withdrawal of federal troops from the south in 1877.151  
By around 1890, this practical federal abdication had plunged the South 
into the era of Jim Crow.  States began once more to pass contract-
enforcement and vagrancy laws, as well as laws restricting the activities 
of labor recruiters,152 expanding the convict-lease system,153 imposing 
poll taxes and literacy tests to suppress the black vote, mandating  
segregation in railway travel, and increasing racial disparities in  
educational funding.154  In addition to passing public laws of subordi-
nation, the South also pursued the same results through private discrim-
ination and law enforcement patterns: the sharecropping system and 
debt-cycles also worked to entrap and subordinate blacks; and while 
white police forces, state militias, and judicial systems enforced Jim 
Crow laws, their failure to enforce other laws allowed racial terror to 
grow to such proportions that people referred to this aspect of the sub-
ordination regime as an independent, extrajudicial order — “lynch 
law.”155  As a result, black migration out of the South increased dramat-
ically in the 1890s, and about 185,000 people went North that decade.156 
Private discrimination in the North, freshly sanctioned, continued to 
limit the possibility of black migration there, however.  In the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries, sundown towns, where white citi-
zens committed collectively to maintaining the racial homogeneity of 
their jurisdictions, were steadily increasing across the North and 
West.157  In urban centers, too, private employers widely refused to hire 
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black people, producing “the very hard fact that, though the North  
afforded larger privileges, it would not support negroes.”158  In a testa-
ment to the force of private discrimination, black migration north re-
mained low until the outbreak of World War I abruptly halted European 
immigration to the country.159  Northern factory owners who faced labor 
shortages just as they stood to gain spectacular profits from war mobi-
lization then opened their doors to women and blacks in large numbers 
for the first time, triggering the mass exodus from the South known as 
the Great Migration.160  As one Mississippian explained, “[b]efore the 
North opened up with work all we could do was move from one plan-
tation to another in hope of finding something better.”161 
Jim Crow was not a self-deportation regime.  This public regime of 
subordination, rather, was designed to hold black labor captive in the 
South.  The Great Migration nevertheless reveals the structural simili-
tude of subordination regimes intended to control labor and to cause 
removal, and the way a single regime can achieve both.  It also exposed 
the external, background conditions that southerners had taken for 
granted in designing the labor control regime of Jim Crow — namely, 
the prevalence of self-deportation policies in the North and the intran-
sigence of northern private discrimination.  By banking on black people 
having nowhere else to go, southern lawmakers believed they could 
maintain the population as a source of cheap labor with little recourse 
to the law.  However, by using the tool of private discrimination as a 
lever, northern employers activated the logic of relativity inherent in 
subordination to show that better options elsewhere could convert a sys-
tem designed to entrap people into one that functioned to drive them 
out.162  Against the backdrop of “stay out” public regimes of discrimina-
tion in the North, the Great Migration underscored the power of  
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contrasting levels of private discrimination to influence migration by 
creating the conditions for a group’s life possibilities in a place. 
The Fourteenth Amendment’s constraint on state power elevated 
longstanding and pervasive discrimination in the private sphere to a 
constitutional principle.  This national institutionalization of the public 
and private roles in subordination held significant meaning for removal 
policy at a moment when abolition had propelled the nation into a 
search for new sources of cheap labor and new methods of labor control.  
As employers increasingly turned toward nonwhite foreigners for cheap 
labor, the increasing presence of these populations in the country incited 
the demand for their removal.  Meanwhile, Jim Crow’s use of subordi-
nation to control labor accented the extent to which removal strategies 
relied on private discrimination.  This structural homology suggested 
that, within a territory newly consolidated and under U.S. control, the 
approach of attacking immigrants’ lives could accomplish both labor 
control and removal.  Consequently, as the next Part explores, indirect 
removal strategies that had long been used to accumulate property in 
land now became a method of controlling foreign labor, while the sub-
ordination that had long been their mechanism became another end of 
the policy in itself. 
II.  THE RISE OF THE MODERN REMOVAL SYSTEM 
Part II describes how the advent of the federal individual deporta-
tion system renovated the removal system of the United States.  In doing 
so, it integrates the history of self-deportation with the better-known 
history of the deportation system to offer a new narrative about the rise 
of the modern removal system overall.  Section II.A recounts how the 
increasing population of Chinese people in western states spurred  
another round of subfederal self-deportation laws targeting it for public 
discrimination; again, the Supreme Court found such laws preempted 
by the federal prerogative to regulate removal, now under the  
Fourteenth Amendment’s new prohibitions on discriminatory state ac-
tion.  Once more, the legislature and Executive responded by exercising 
the federal prerogative to advance the national practice of direct re-
moval, this time through the establishment of the individual deportation 
system.  As Congress widened this system’s reach and power, however, 
it also notably leveraged the new threat of deportation to reshape its 
self-deportation policy.  Similarly, when the Executive escalated remov-
als, it did not rely on its newly crafted legal channels so much as imple-
ment hybrid techniques that drew on the indirect effects of the deporta-
tion system.  With subfederal help, it conducted widespread raids that 
spread terror and caused self-deportation while bringing people into the 
net of the deportation system; and for the mass removals of the Great  
Depression, it used “voluntary departure” programs that recruited de-
portees with fear and the promise of financing their transportation out 
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of the country.  Section II.B then turns to the most recent cycle of sub-
federal self-deportation legislation, the Court’s rejection of most of its 
provisions based on preemption, and the legislative and executive surge 
in deportation policy that has followed in response.  Here, consistent 
with past practice, the Court granted subfederal governments direct  
enforcement powers to broaden the reach of the deportation system.  
The legislature and Executive concurrently and rapidly intensified the  
deportation system by streamlining its processes and amplifying its  
self-deportation effects.  Indeed, the hallmark of contemporary removal 
policy is its expansion of the grounds of deportability far beyond the 
possibility of actual enforcement.  The widespread threats these devel-
opments create function to subordinate a population on which the na-
tion relies heavily for labor, suggesting that the policy works in the ser-
vice of outcomes other than removal alone: now, the strong emphasis on 
removal in discourse about immigration law and policy obscures  
another effect of the immigration system — subordination in the service 
of labor control. 
A.  The Individual Deportation System  
and Its Self-Deportation Effects 
In the mid-nineteenth century, the federal and state governments be-
gan to contemplate the removal of nonwhite immigrants, whom they 
did not consider to be potential members of the national polity but who 
were present in increasing numbers.163  As in the late 1820s, states and 
municipalities began to pass legislation designed to attack different  
aspects of these people’s lives.  The Supreme Court asserted federal  
supremacy over the regulation of removal and struck down these new 
subfederal laws as discrimination, noting that the removal aim motivat-
ing them was evident.  While it did so, the federal government exercised 
its prerogative to build an individual deportation system upon the foun-
dations of its indirect approach to removal, which began to work 
through the new deportation system almost immediately.164 
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 163 These immigrants came primarily from China, Japan, India, and Mexico, among other places.  
See, e.g., Gerald P. López, Undocumented Mexican Migration: In Search of a Just Immigration Law 
and Policy, 28 UCLA L. REV. 615 (1981); Sherally Munshi, Race, Geography, and Mobility, 30 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 245, 246, 278 n.182 (2016).  Government reports, including the Dillingham Commission 
report of 1911, show that Mexican laborers were considered useful but undesirable as citizens, and 
not potential members of the community.  1 U.S. IMMIGRATION COMM’N, ABSTRACTS OF RE-
PORTS, S. DOC. NO. 61-747, at 682–91 (3d Sess. 1910). 
 164 My analysis contests the idea that in the absence of federal direct removal policy, there was 
no federal removal policy.  Cf. HIROTA, supra note 29, at 9; DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION 
NATION 92–95 (2007); MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS 58 (2014) (counting poor laws and 
the Alien and Sedition Laws as antecedents and noting that other than these, “the nation operated 
without federal regulation of immigration for the better part of the nineteenth century.  Unfettered 
migration was crucial for the settlement and industrialization of America, even if the laboring mi-
grants themselves were not always free.”); DANIEL TICHENOR, DIVIDING LINES 87–113 (2001); 
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During this period, states and municipalities began to clamor for the 
removal of Chinese immigrants.165  California Governor John Bigler 
called for head taxes and a foreign miners’ tax to target this group, as 
well as for their disqualification as jurors and witnesses in state 
courts.166  In 1856, Mariposa County, California, ordered all the Chinese 
within its jurisdiction to leave, or to be whipped and then removed “by 
force of arms.”167  In 1860, San Francisco denied Chinese people admis-
sion to San Francisco City Hospital168 and Chinese children admission 
to general public schools,169 and California passed “An Act to Protect 
Free White Labor Against Competition with Chinese Coolie Labor.”170  
In 1870, San Francisco banned the use of shoulder poles to carry vege-
tables and laundry bundles171 and, between 1873 and 1875, passed a 
variety of ordinances banning the use of firecrackers and Chinese  
ceremonial gongs.172 
Again, the Supreme Court found that the federal government held 
preemptive power to regulate removal from the country, and denied 
state and local governments the power to directly subordinate the Chinese 
toward that end.  In its 1875 decision in Chy Lung v. Freeman,173 for  
example, the Court struck down a California statute that “very clearly” 
aimed to “extort money from a large class of passengers, or to prevent 
their immigration to California altogether.”174  Over the next decade, the 
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 165 PETER SCHRAG, NOT FIT FOR OUR SOCIETY 36–37 (2010). 
 166 The California Supreme Court granted part of Bigler’s wish in People v. Hall, 4 Cal. 399 
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 167 IRIS CHANG, THE CHINESE IN AMERICA 90 (2003). 
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San Francisco) (on file with the Harvard University Library); see also Joyce Kuo, Comment, Ex-
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 170 Act of Apr. 26, 1862, ch. 339, 1862 Cal. Stat. 462 (1862), invalidated by Lin Sing v. Washburn, 
20 Cal. 534 (1862). 
 171 Order No. 697 (May 4, 1866), in SAN FRANCISCO MUNICIPAL REPORTS FOR THE FISCAL 
YEAR 1871–1872, ENDING JUNE 30, 1872, at 503, 520; Christopher Chou, Land Use and the  
Chinatown Problem, 19 ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 27, 40 (2014). 
 172 Order No. 697 (May 4, 1866), in SAN FRANCISCO MUNICIPAL REPORTS FOR THE FISCAL 
YEAR 1874–1875, ENDING JUNE 30, 1875, at 791, 807; Order No. 884 (July 29, 1869), in SAN  
FRANCISCO MUNICIPAL REPORTS FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 1868–1869, ENDING JUNE 30, 1869, 
at 544, 544. 
 173 92 U.S. 275 (1875). 
 174 Id. at 275. 
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Court invoked the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to affirm its prohibition of subfederal self-deportation laws institut-
ing public discrimination.  In 1879, for example, Supreme Court Justice 
Field, riding circuit, found that San Francisco’s “Pigtail Ordinance”  
violated the prohibition on discriminatory state action because it  
targeted Han Chinese prisoners who wore their hair in long braids.175  
In the 1886 case Yick Wo v. Hopkins,176 the Court similarly struck down 
a San Francisco law requiring permits to operate laundries in wooden 
buildings, which targeted the Chinese population.177  It quoted a lower 
court, which found that the law “indicate[d] a purpose to drive out the 
Chinese laundrymen, and not merely to regulate the business for the 
public safety.”178  
Instead, during a period called the “Driving Out,” the work of  
subordination fell to private citizens, who set fires to Chinatowns and 
committed massacres and mob violence with little interference from law 
enforcement.179  As they did so, Congress began to build the federal 
individual deportation system.  Most famously, the Chinese Exclusion 
Act of 1882 for the first time prohibited the entry of a specific ethnic 
group to preserve “good order” and brought individual deportation, 
which had long been the province of states and municipalities, under 
the purview of the federal government.180  During their first years, fed-
eral deportation laws focused only on immigrants’ preentry conduct and 
contained statutes of limitation;181 courts ensured immigrants’ rights to 
process,182 and the reach of the system was relatively limited.  Nonethe-
less, the creation of the system itself sent a strong expressive message, 
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 175 Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan, 12 F. Cas. 252, 255 (C.C.D. Cal. 1879) (No. 6546); Joseph Tartakovsky, 
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 177 See id. at 372–73. 
 178 Id. at 363 (quoting In re Yick Wo, 26 F. 471, 475 (C.C.D. Cal. 1886)). 
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17, 1943, ch. 344, 57 Stat. 600. 
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Rodríguez observe, neither provided for deportation nor made mention of immigrants’ post entry 
conduct.  Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 164, at 512, 514; see also Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, § 1, 
18 Stat. 477, 477.  They note that the anomalous Alien and Enemies Act of 1798 is one exception.  
Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 164, at 512 n.184; see also Act of June 25, 1798, ch. 58, §§ 1–3, 1 Stat. 
570, 570–71. 
 182 See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896). 
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and the new threat of deportation combined with congressional 
measures to make life more difficult for Chinese people in ways that 
indirectly encouraged their removal.183  Congress also quickly began to 
expand federal direct removal power by adding causes for which it could 
deport a person under law, including a range of postentry conduct.   
Between 1907 and 1922, it made deportable immigrants who engaged 
in prostitution, advocated anarchy, committed crimes of moral turpi-
tude, or had convictions for importing or dealing opium, respectively.184  
It then began to eliminate statutes of limitations, making people indefi-
nitely deportable for these reasons.185  Still, the Immigration Service 
oversaw few deportations during this period — “only a few hundred 
aliens a year between 1892 and 1907,”186 and an annual average of two 
or three thousand between 1908 and 1920.187 
Because employers again found themselves in need of cheap replace-
ment labor during the era of Chinese Exclusion, inspectors did not  
regulate Mexicans entering across the southwestern border for work in 
railroad construction, mining, and agriculture during the first two  
decades of the twentieth century.188  Many fundamental aspects of the 
modern deportation system emerged during the 1920s.  The Immigra-
tion Acts of 1921 and 1924 imposed numerical restrictions on immigra-
tion for the first time,189 creating the basis for a system of selective ad-
missions.  The 1924 Act finally eliminated statutes of limitations on 
nearly all forms of unlawful entry.  In Professor Mae Ngai’s words, these 
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 183 For example, the 1892 Geary Act required Chinese people to obtain a certificate of residence 
to prove their presence in the country was authorized.  “Show me your papers” laws at this time 
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documentation requirements). 
 184 Immigration Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 19, 39 Stat. 874, 889; Immigration Act of Feb. 20, 
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Stat. 263, 264–65. 
 186 NGAI, supra note 164, at 59. 
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DISSENTERS 221 (1963). 
 188 NGAI, supra note 164, at 64. 
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valid visa or inspection after July 1 of that year.  Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, § 14, 43 Stat. 
153, 162. 
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restrictions “stimulated the production of illegal aliens” to “mass propor-
tions.”190  In 1925, Congress created a land Border Patrol, a force with 
little supervision and no formal training that quickly assumed the char-
acter of criminal pursuit, despite being charged with enforcing civil 
laws.191  Congress criminalized immigrants in 1929 by making unlawful 
entry an independent criminal offense — a misdemeanor punishable by 
imprisonment or a fine, or both — and a second unlawful entry after 
deportation a felony carrying double the consequences of the first.192 
The rapid expansion of the pool of deportable persons quickly out-
stripped the deportation capacity of the system.  The deportation system 
did facilitate an increasing number of actual deportations, but its capac-
ity to deport the growing population of people subject to its reach was 
inherently limited by the individual process it required.193  As Secretary 
Kobach reflected nearly a century later, “[i]t takes considerable govern-
ment manpower and other resources to arrest [a person], initiate removal 
proceedings, detain him if necessary, provide the hearings and appellate 
review to which he is entitled, and ultimately remove him.”194  As the 
total number of deportations rose, these processes proved so costly for 
the government that in 1928, the Assistant Secretary of Labor requested 
a budget for deportations amounting to more than ten times the appro-
priation of the previous year.195 
By contrast, Kobach notes, “[i]t costs the federal government very 
little when aliens self-deport.”196  The new deportation system magnified 
the government’s ability to threaten immigrants with apprehension, de-
tention, and deportation.  Deportation laws, in other words, immediately 
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began to serve the double purpose they do now.  Indeed, the indirect 
function of the new deportation system quickly produced the irony that 
although deportation laws on the books allowed for the removal of a 
larger population than ever before during the 1920s and 1930s, the vast 
majority of people removed during this time did not leave through the 
process created by these laws.197  Rather, the federal government com-
bined direct and indirect methods in such programs as “voluntary de-
parture” and raids that, on the pretense of enforcing deportation law, 
terrorized communities to encourage them to self-deport. 
In the early 1920s, the United States worked with the Mexican gov-
ernment to create a “voluntary departure” program administered by 
Mexican consuls that provided “free return transportation to the  
Mexican interior and subsistence” to around 100,000 people between 
1920 and 1923.198  The government thereby recruited deportees by 
promising to cover some of their costs in a compromise that, like the 
exchanges of lands the United States engaged in with tribes a century 
earlier, saved the government significant funds while also relieving de-
portees of some burdens.199  In 1927, the Immigration Service again be-
gan to offer “voluntary departure” to aliens without criminal records to 
avoid the time and expense of formal deportation proceedings.200  The 
number of people the government expelled each year consequently rose 
from 2762 in 1920201 to 9495 in 1925,202 and to 38,796 in 1929.203 
During the Great Depression, economic insecurity further inflamed 
white Americans’ racial hostility toward people of Mexican descent, re-
gardless of whether these people were in the country legally or not, or 
were citizens.204  Although immigration from Mexico had abated,205 re-
moval numbers reached new heights206 as the Border Patrol, under the 
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auspices of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), began to 
apprehend large numbers of people in “sweeps.”207  During this period, 
the federal government sought to enlist state and local aid to increase 
the capacity of the federal deportation system and its self-deportation 
effects.  In particular, U.S. Secretary of Labor William Doak “encour-
aged local immigration officers, law enforcement agencies, and newspa-
pers to join forces to publicize deportation raids, frightening many  
Mexicans into self-deportation.”208  State and municipal agents thereafter 
collaborated with federal officers to conduct surprise raids that involved 
intimidation tactics including circling and barricading in residents of 
colonias and that resulted in the arrest, interrogation, and  
detention of scores of people.209  The head of the L.A. Citizens  
Committee on the Coordination of Unemployment Relief, Charles Visel, 
commended the Immigration Service’s “efficiency, aggressiveness, [and] 
resourcefulness” in using these tactics, stating: “The exodus of aliens de-
portable and otherwise who have been scared out of the community has 
undoubtedly left many jobs which have been taken up by other persons 
(not deportable) and citizens of the U.S. and our municipality.”210 
In these raids, the federal deportation power served as the excuse for 
spreading terror that fueled both self-deportation and the success of lo-
cal “voluntary departure” programs across the Southwest and Midwest.  
Welfare bureaus and relief workers played a significant role in pressur-
ing immigrants to leave.211  One major obstacle to their wholesale de-
portation, however, was the expense of deportation hearings, which 
meant, as Californians concluded, that actual deportation “could not be 
used to advantage in ousting any large number.”212  Instead, Los Angeles 
county relief agencies opened negotiations with the Southern Pacific 
Railroad to organize “voluntary departure” programs, and discovered 
that “in wholesale lots, the Mexicans could be shipped to Mexico City 
for $14.70 per capita . . . less than the cost of a week’s board and lodg-
ing.”213  During the early 1930s, Southwestern and Midwestern states 
removed over 400,000 people, many by train.214  A large number had 
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been in the country for at least a decade, and an estimated 60% were 
citizens, children, or both.215  In a final “voluntary” deportation at the 
end of the decade, the INS transported 1200 people, about half of whom 
were citizens, to the border with Mexico at Brownsville, Texas.216 
At this time, state and local governments focused on welfare, local 
law enforcement policies, and public employment as areas where they 
might permissibly discriminate against immigrants.  Drawing on the tra-
dition of poor laws, California towns passed settlement laws denying 
welfare to unemployed migrant workers.  In El Paso, Texas, local relief 
agencies reported lists of Mexicans on their rolls, including citizens and 
legal residents, to immigration authorities for deportation.217  Many 
towns, including the City of Los Angeles, tried to keep indigent migrants 
from entering by stationing police at “bum blockades.”218  Colorado 
Governor Edwin C. Johnson sought to reserve “the possibility of  
employment . . . for only native sons,”219 proclaimed martial law in 
southern counties in 1936, and instructed Military District officers to 
prevent Mexican workers with labor contracts from entering the 
state.220  Arizona passed laws punishing anyone who hired noncitizens 
as public employees with a fine or imprisonment.221 
The way the federal government coordinated the direct removal of 
over one million people of Mexican ancestry during this era222 was con-
sistent with the historical development of its removal policy.  Subfederal 
entities’ role was restricted to expanding the federal government’s de-
portation capacity, determining local law enforcement priorities, and 
denying unauthorized immigrants welfare and public employment.  
Both federal and state governments stoked the hostility of private citi-
zens toward Mexicans to encourage them to make life unbearable for 
Mexicans so that they would self-deport.  The individual deportation 
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system, however, strengthened and systematized the coordination be-
tween the actors carrying out removal policy.  An emerging bureaucracy 
of federal immigration officers assumed a newly significant role in re-
moval policy and collaborated explicitly and routinely with state and 
local law enforcement.  All actors, public and private, could use as new 
leverage the threat of deportation furnished to carry out their work.  As 
the volume of federal removal laws burgeoned, those laws threatened 
an ever-increasing number of immigrants, growing the government’s co-
ercive bargaining power vis-à-vis deportees.  In other words, the indi-
vidual deportation system breathed new life into the well-worn indirect 
approach to removal in the United States. 
B.  Mass Removal Strategies in the Modern Era 
The national removal system’s evolution during the first half of the 
twentieth century set the stage for the developments that followed.  
Courts continued to cabin states’ and municipalities’ role within the na-
tional removal scheme and protect the federal government’s coordina 
ting role.  Congress continued to expand the grounds of deportability far 
beyond the possibility of enforcement.  In combination with the private 
sector’s creation of incentives through the furnishing of jobs, which  
induced people to enter the country,223 these trends resulted in an  
enormous population of deportable people in the country and a national 
immigration code that went largely unenforced.  This production of an 
excess of options to legally remove people widened the berth of executive 
discretion both to determine its deportation priorities and to calibrate 
self-deportation policy by leveraging the threats inherent in federal  
deportation law.  Below, I describe the developments in immigration 
law, including the establishment of alienage case law and growth of the 
federal immigration code, that led to the most recent wave of subfederal 
attempts to legislate public discrimination, courts’ preemption of these 
laws, and the ways that the subsequent legislative and executive build-
up of the deportation system has worked to maximize its self- 
deportation effects. 
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 223 The Bracero Program, which bridged the first and second halves of the century, provides a 
good illustration of the delegation to the private sphere that allowed employers to incentivize im-
migration to the United States.  After the statutory authorization for this war-time worker recruit-
ment program expired in 1947, see Farm Labor Supply Program-Extension-Liquidation, Pub. L. 
No. 80-40, 61 Stat. 55 (1947), the INS allowed employers to directly recruit bracero workers from 
Mexico.  The INS further helped to reduce the costs of recruitment for employers and encourage 
workers’ unauthorized entry by prioritizing, for a period, the legalization of unauthorized immi-
grants already present in the United States.  See KITTY CALAVITA, INSIDE THE STATE 2 (1992).  
Indeed, in 1951, President Truman’s Commission on Migratory Labor found that the INS “had 
effectively abdicated its border control responsibility” and that its legalization policies, lax enforce-
ment, with the incentives created by employers, “had given rise to unprecedented levels of illegal 
immigration.”  Id.  The program was not terminated for another seventeen years.  Id. at 3. 
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In the twentieth century, states and municipalities continued to pass 
self-deportation legislation in the tradition of extension laws.  The Court 
continued to invoke the Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition on public 
discrimination, thereby establishing a famous line of cases scrutinizing 
the status of “alienage.”224  In the 1948 case Takahashi v. Fish & Game 
Commission,225 the Court struck down a California statute forbidding 
aliens “ineligible to citizenship” from receiving commercial fishing li-
censes;226 in Graham v. Richardson227 in 1971, the Court invalidated an 
Arizona law requiring citizenship or fifteen years of residence to receive 
welfare benefits;228 and in 1982, in Plyler v. Doe,229 the Court struck 
down a state statute denying funding for unauthorized children, block-
ing a municipal school district’s attempt to charge unauthorized children 
an annual tuition fee.230  In the 1976 case Mathews v. Diaz,231 however, 
the Court affirmed and reserved the federal government’s right to dis-
criminate as a privilege of its supremacy in the field of immigration.232 
It is worth noting how this development contributed to interpreta-
tions that have isolated the component parts of self-deportation policy 
and made it more difficult to grasp their overall logic.  The Fourteenth 
Amendment’s consecration of the prohibition on public discrimination 
led to courts’ application of this doctrine to some self-deportation laws 
and the doctrine of preemption to others.  This split has given rise to an 
artificial yet potent division between “alienage laws,” or laws imposing 
conditions upon alien status, and “immigration laws,” or laws affecting 
a person’s entry into, exit from, or authorization within the country.233  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 224 With some notable exceptions: During the second and third decades of the twentieth century, 
the Supreme Court repeatedly upheld the constitutionality of western states’ alien land laws.  See, 
e.g., Frick v. Webb, 263 U.S. 326 (1923); Webb v. O’Brien, 263 U.S. 313 (1923); Porterfield v. Webb, 
263 U.S. 225 (1923); Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923).  These laws first targeted immi-
grants’ fee simple ownership of or long-term lease of agricultural lands, and then targeted their 
ability to hold sharecropping contracts or shares of stock in corporations owning such lands.  See 
Keith Aoki, No Right to Own?: Early Twentieth Century “Alien Land Laws” as a Prelude to Intern-
ment, 40 B.C. L. REV. 37, 38 (1998).  The Court’s decisions scrutinizing alienage status indicate a 
continuing intimacy between property and membership, while the Court’s invocation of the  
Fourteenth Amendment indicates that its discomfort with subfederal institution of public discrim-
ination might stem from the legacy of Jim Crow. 
 225 334 U.S. 410 (1948). 
 226 Id. at 412, 422. 
 227 403 U.S. 365 (1971). 
 228 Id. at 371, 374. 
 229 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
 230 Id. at 216, 230. 
 231 426 U.S. 67 (1976). 
 232 Id. at 84–85. 
 233 MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW, supra note 3, at 58.  In 1994, Professor 
Linda Bosniak explained how these categories produce different legal possibilities, since in “the 
world of social relationships among territorially present persons, . . . government power to impose 
disabilities on people based on their status is substantially constrained,” while the government’s 
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With respect to this doctrinal confusion, many scholars have noted that 
these categories overlap as a practical matter;234 because laws concern-
ing entry and exit affect how immigrants live, and vice versa, Professor 
Adam Cox, for example, has written that “legal rules cannot be classified 
as concerning either selection or regulation because every rule concerns 
both.”235  This overlap is not incidental, however, in self-deportation 
laws, which concern both selection and regulation by design.  Nonethe-
less, it has become common sense to see the infringement of these cate-
gories upon each other as only ancillary, as evidenced in two widespread 
ideas: 1) that federal immigration laws inflict suffering as an unfortunate 
byproduct of their other, legitimate goals; and 2) that state and munici-
pal alienage laws can impose some “appropriate” level of discrimination, 
but exceed what is “tolerable” when they infringe on the federal immi-
gration power by affecting entry and exit.236  Notably, framing this over-
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immigration power, by contrast, “remains exceptionally unconstrained.”  Linda S. Bosniak, Mem-
bership, Equality, and the Difference that Alienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1047, 1056 (1994).  
Kobach therefore advocated for subfederal self-deportation laws as properly constructed immigra-
tion regulations, skirting the question of discrimination altogether in his theory of “attrition through 
enforcement.”  See sources cited supra note 12.  He put forth a rubric for drafting statutes to avoid 
federal preemption, Kobach, Reinforcing the Rule of Law, supra note 12, at 464–65, and elsewhere 
argued that self-deportation laws would act as a “quintessential force multiplier,” see Kris W.  
Kobach, The Quintessential Force Multiplier: The Inherent Authority of Local Police to Make Im-
migration Arrests, 69 ALB. L. REV. 179 (2005). 
 234 See, e.g., Bosniak, supra note 233; Linda Bosniak, Varieties of Citizenship, 75 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2449, 2451–52 (2007) (showing that the distinction between alienage and immigration law is 
highly problematic); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration and Alienage, Federalism and Proposition 
187, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 201, 203 (1994); David S. Rubenstein, Immigration Structuralism: A Return 
to Form, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 81, 120 (2013) (“[C]haracterizing subfederal regula-
tions as either ‘immigration’ or ‘alienage’ is frustrated by the very nature of the inquiry and by the 
inescapable truth that subfederal regulations are usually a bit of both.”); Michael J. Wishnie,  
Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration Power, Equal Protection, and Federalism, 
76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493, 526 (2001) (observing that the distinction is not consistently embraced in 
case law).  But see Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Federalism, 
61 VAND. L. REV. 787, 798–99 (2008) (acknowledging this overlap but emphasizing the importance 
of the distinction for understanding immigration federalism); Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Signifi-
cance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 591–93 (2008) (drawing a 
distinction between “[d]irect enforcement measures” and “[i]ndirect enforcement measures,” but  
acknowledging that public benefits statutes also “operate as forms of indirect enforcement, because 
they discourage immigrant settlement and prompt what restrictionists call ‘self-deportation,’ or 
movement to other communities or to the home country”). 
 235 Adam B. Cox, Immigration Law’s Organizing Principles, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 341, 343 (2008). 
 236 In his discussion of Proposition 187, for example, Neuman argues for limits on discrimination 
against aliens, writing that “even if some goods can be reserved for citizens, it hardly follows that 
all goods can.”  Neuman, supra note 16, at 1427.  During oral arguments for Plyler, Justice  
Thurgood Marshall queried whether such limits derive from the harm to the targeted group or to 
greater society, and asked the attorney for Texas if the state could deny fire protection to unauthor-
ized persons.  MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW, supra note 3, at 19.  When the 
attorney said he did not think that it could, Justice Marshall asked rhetorically, “Why 
not? . . .  Somebody’s house is more important than his child?”  Id.  Bosniak, too, asked when, 
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lap as nonessential obscures two of the most important aspects of con-
temporary self-deportation policy: 1) the use of alienage provisions pre-
cisely to make life intolerable and thereby cause a group’s removal; and 
2) the use of deportation law to subordinate a class of workers.  
In 1952, the Immigration and Nationality Act237 (INA) consolidated 
the provisions governing entry, removal, and authorized presence in the 
United States.238  This law established a selective admissions system 
that eventually created preferences for skilled laborers and relatives of 
citizens.239  The 1952 Act also initiated a streamlining of process by 
making the crime of illegal entry a “petty offense” punishable by six 
months’ imprisonment, channeling these cases to new misdemeanor 
courts, and thereby eliminating grand jury indictments and jury trials, 
to reduce both the expenses and protections of the process.240  During 
the next decades, the unauthorized population grew as a result of the 
new caps on admissions, lax enforcement on the southern border for 
labor purposes,241 and legislative acts that deauthorized more and more 
persons already present in the United States.  Through a series of  
restrictive amendments, Congress continued to expand the grounds of 
deportability to apply to lawful entrants who overstayed their visas and 
individuals who engaged in an increasingly wide range of post-entry 
conduct.242  As Professors Adam Cox and Cristina Rodríguez have com-
mented, the consequence of the new laws was to render both “a huge 
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through imposing suffering upon those who perform “much of our society’s undesirable labor[,] . . . 
immigration regulation exceeds its legitimate bounds and becomes little more than a mechanism 
for institutionalizing the status of a permanent underclass in our society.”  Bosniak, supra note 233, 
at 1146–47. 
 237 Pub. L. No. 414, 66 Stat. 1632 (1952) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
 238 See Developments in the Law — Immigration and Nationality, 66 HARV. L. REV. 643, 646 
(1953).  
 239 See id. at 652.  The law also abolished the racial restrictions of previous immigration and 
naturalization statutes, see Mae Ngai, The Architecture of Race in American Immigration Law, 86 
J. AM. HIST. 67, 81 (1999), but retained national-origin quotas until Congress passed the Hart-Celler 
Act in 1965, see Munshi, supra note 163, at 281. 
 240 Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1281, 1326–27 (2010). 
 241 Cf. López, supra note 163, at 667–72; Gerald P. López, Don’t We Like Them Illegal?, 45 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1711, 1770–73 (2012).  
 242 See Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 164, at 512; INA § 237(a)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B) 
(2012); INA § 237(a)(1)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(C).  In 1988, Congress made deportable any noncit-
izen with a conviction for an “aggravated felony.”  Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
690, § 7344(a), 102 Stat. 4181, 4470–71 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1251).  While the INA initially defined 
“aggravated felony” as a serious drug trafficking offense, in 1990, 1994, and 1996, Congress ex-
panded the definition of the term to include minor convictions and even some misdemeanors; it also 
made these provisions retroactive.  Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 501, 104 Stat. 
4978, 5048 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1501, 1501 note); Immigration and Nationality Technical  
Corrections Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-416, § 222, 108 Stat. 4305, 4320–22 (codified at 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101, 1101 note); Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-208, div. C, § 321, 110 Stat. 3009–546, 3009–627 to 3009–628 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101, 
1101 note); Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 440, 110 
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fraction of resident noncitizens deportable at the option of the  
Executive” and the laws on the books mostly unenforced.243 
In the early 1990s, economic depression spurred a new wave of anti-
immigrant sentiment.244  In 1994, California voters passed Proposition 
187, which included diverse provisions conscripting state and local law 
enforcement in the apprehension of unauthorized persons, prohibiting 
schools and hospitals from serving unauthorized persons, and criminal-
izing identity fraud.245  While the bill purported to “provide for cooper-
ation between agencies of state and local government with the federal 
government” to regulate immigration,246 a U.S. district court insisted 
that the authority to coordinate national removal policy belonged to the 
federal government alone.247  Nonetheless, states and municipalities 
subsequently introduced hundreds of bills on the model of Proposition 
187, many of which met the same end.248  Despite its general failure to 
create good law, this subfederal legislation illustrated the capacity of 
self-deportation laws to achieve their intended effects even without sur-
viving a preemption challenge.  Because they were calculated to spur 
people’s action in anticipation of harm, the laws often had immediate 
impact; indeed, their effects frequently manifested even before their pas-
sage.  For example, before the vote to pass a self-deportation bill in Avon 
Park, Florida, in 2006, business owners “saw a drop in business from 
immigrants wary of coming into their shops.  At area farms, droves of 
workers stopped showing up to milk the cows and harvest the crops, 
afraid of being arrested.  Landlords saw a sudden rise in vacant apart-
ments.”249  Professor Angela M. Banks has also shown that the laws 
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Stat. 1214, 1276–79 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); see also INA § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(43) (defining “aggravated felony”); Guerrero-Perez v. INS, 242 F.3d 727, 730, 737 (7th Cir. 
2001) (holding that the Illinois Class A misdemeanor of criminal sexual abuse constitutes an “ag-
gravated felony” for purposes of the INA); CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND 
PROCEDURE § 71.05(2)(d) (examining case law interpreting the breadth of “aggravated felony”); 
Dawn Marie Johnson, Note, The AEDPA and the IIRIRA: Treating Misdemeanors as Felonies for 
Immigration Purposes, 27 J. LEGIS. 477 (2001). 
 243 Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 164, at 511; see also MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE 
LAW, supra note 3, at 26. 
 244 Kevin R. Johnson, Free Trade and Closed Borders: NAFTA and Mexican Immigration to the 
United States, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 937, 943–44 (1994). 
 245 Initiative Statute, Proposition 187, 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. (West). 
 246 Id. 
 247 See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 997 F. Supp. 1244, 1253–55 (C.D. Cal. 1997). 
 248 This trend began with Proposition 187 itself.  See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. 
Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 768–69 (C.D. Cal. 1995); see also Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 
401–02 (2012).  Consistently, however, courts did uphold provisions requiring employers to use the 
federal E-Verify system to ascertain the status of employees and authorizing state and local police 
to determine the immigration status of persons.  See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 563 
U.S. 582, 607–11 (2011); United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269, 1283–85 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 249 Christina E. Sanchez, Avon Park Mayor Isn’t Giving Up, SARASOTA HERALD TRIB. (July 
26, 2006), http://www.heraldtribune.com/article/LK/20060726/News/605228621/SH/ [https://perma. 
cc/L3LZ-644M]. 
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discouraged immigrants from naturalizing even when they were eligi-
ble.250  Finally, the laws had a viral effect on private citizens: after the 
passage of H.B. 56, citizens in Alabama “acted as if they themselves 
were deputized to enforce H.B. 56”;251 the laws motivated anti- 
immigrant activism and hardened non-Hispanic citizens’ views of all 
Hispanics, regardless of citizenship, while increasing white citizens’ 
fears about lawlessness and crime.252 
These laws, and their preemption, have been accompanied by a  
massive buildup of the deportation system by Congress and the  
Executive.253  Shortly after the passage of Proposition 187, Congress 
passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility 
Act of 1996254 (IIRIRA) and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Pen-
alty Act255 (AEDPA).  With these laws, Congress surprised a huge pop-
ulation of lawful entrants by deauthorizing their presence, in addition 
to narrowing both long-standing pathways to obtaining authorized sta-
tus and forms of relief such as cancellation of removal.256  As these leg-
islative changes catalyzed the commission of new immigration viola-
tions, the executive branch concurrently ratcheted up enforcement but 
could not keep up with the scale of these legislative transformations.  
Between 1993 and 1999, for example, the annual budget of the INS 
nearly tripled to reach $4.2 billion; by 2010, the combined budgets of its 
successor agencies, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS), together reconstituted as the 
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 250 Angela M. Banks, The Curious Relationship Between “Self-Deportation” Policies and Natu-
ralization Rates, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1149, 1152 (2012).  The U.S. Citizenship and  
Immigration Services’s (USCIS’s) push to denaturalize individuals under the Obama-era program 
Operation Janus is likely to have the same effect.  Cf. Amy Taxin, U.S. Launches Bid to Find Citizen-
ship Cheaters, AP NEWS (June 11, 2018), https://apnews.com/1da389a535684a5f9d0da74081c242f3 
[https:// 
perma.cc/6FJN-X6RQ] (describing USCIS’s Operation Janus initiative). 
 251 Benjamin D. Galloway, Comment, Perpetual Congressional Inaction: State Regulation of Im-
migration in Response to Lack of Reform, 65 MERCER L. REV. 795, 820 (2014). 
 252 See René D. Flores, The Social Consequences of Subnational Restrictionist Immigration Pol-
icies in the U.S., at III (Sept. 2014) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Princeton University) (on file 
with author). 
 253 See, e.g., Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (codified in scattered sections 
of 8 U.S.C.) (2012); Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 
Stat. 3359 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code) (2012). 
 254 Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code) (2012). 
 255 Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1217 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code) 
(2012).  Indeed, after California Governor Gray Davis abandoned the state’s appeal of the 1998 
ruling that found most of Proposition 187 unconstitutional, he commented that, “Yes, but” —  
despite the formal failure of Proposition 187 — “it is supplanted by federal legislation that is faithful 
to the will of the voters who passed 187.”  GRACE CHANG, DISPOSABLE DOMESTICS 8 (2016). 
 256 MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW, supra note 3, at 28.  The legislative path 
therefore raises a puzzle: In the face of a supposed “crisis” of enforcement, why would Congress 
exacerbate the situation by choosing, among other things, to convert legally present persons into 
more unauthorized immigrants? 
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Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003, exceeded $20 bil-
lion.257  Nonetheless, in 2010, ICE had the capacity to arrest only about 
2–3% of the estimated 22 million unauthorized persons present in the 
United States.258 
The fruits of this growth have encompassed a succession of programs 
and initiatives to further strip deportation of procedural protections, re-
duce the costs of deportation, and maximize the self-deportation effects 
of the deportation system.  In 2005, DHS and DOJ’s joint initiative 
“Operation Streamline” began the practice of now-routine en masse, 
“fast track” trials of up to seventy defendants at once, with proceedings 
lasting as little as twenty-five seconds for each individual.259  In 2008, 
ICE unsuccessfully tried to replicate historical “voluntary departure” 
programs with an initiative entitled “Operation Scheduled Departure,”260 
which sought to avoid the costs of apprehending and detaining immi-
grants.  However, only eight out of 457,000 eligible immigrants appeared 
for deportation.261  More successfully, the federal government has in-
creasingly delegated law enforcement power to state and local law offi-
cials to expand the reach of the deportation system, especially by inte-
grating immigration and criminal law systems while emphasizing the 
“criminal alien” in policy justifications.262  The federal government has 
also rapidly escalated its reliance upon summary removal proceedings, 
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 257 Id. at 50.  
 258 Memorandum from John Morton, Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to All ICE 
Employees (June 30, 2010) [hereinafter Morton Memo]; Mohammad M. Fazel-Zarandi et al., The 
Number of Undocumented Immigrants in the United States: Estimates Based on Modeling with 
Demographic Data from 1990–2016, PLOS ONE (2018), https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0201193 
[https://perma.cc/S9ZL-CMYG]. 
 259 See, e.g., Fernanda Santos, Detainees Sentenced in Seconds in “Streamline” Justice on Bor-
der, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2014), https://nyti.ms/1fWYvIU [https://perma.cc/E8LN-KWTC]. 
 260 U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, ICE Scheduled Departure Program for Non-Crimi-
nal Fugitive Aliens, https://web.archive.org/web/20080917222707/http://www.ice.gov/scheduled- 
departure/index.htm [https://perma.cc/43VK-3E3B].  This program and its historical antecedents 
should not be confused with the statutory options of “voluntary departure” under INA § 240(B) and 
withdrawal of application for entry under INA § 235(a)(4).  For an overview of the statistical sig-
nificance of such “returns,” see ALISON SISKIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ALIEN REMOVALS 
AND RETURNS 14 (2015), which describes how the number of such returns exceeded 1 million 
persons annually between 1997 and 2006, with the exception of 2003. 
 261 ALEXANDRA FILINDRA, AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, IMMIGRATION POLICY CTR., 
THE MYTH OF SELF DEPORTATION 5–6 (Apr. 2012). 
 262 For descriptions and analyses of this integration, see Jennifer M. Chacón, Managing Migra-
tion Through Crime, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 135, 137 (2009); Angélica Cházaro, Challenging 
the “Criminal Alien” Paradigm, 63 UCLA L. REV. 594, 643 (2016); Ingrid V. Eagly, Criminal Justice 
for Noncitizens: An Analysis of Variation in Local Enforcement, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1126, 1146 
(2013); Eagly, supra note 240, at 1300; Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: 
Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 475 (2007); 
Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. 
REV. 367, 381 (2006). 
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including expedited removal,263 reinstatement of removal,264  
administrative removal,265 and stipulated orders of removal.266  As a 
result of such processes, in 2015 and 2016, in approximately 85% of all 
deportations conducted by the United States, individuals did not have a 
hearing, never saw an immigration judge, and were deported through 
“cursory administrative processes where the same presiding immigration 
officer acted as the prosecutor, judge, and jailor.”267 
Within the individual deportation system, the new absence of proce-
dural protections creates numerous opportunities for government agents 
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 263 In 1996, the IIRIRA added expedited removal to the INA, making it mandatory for DHS 
officials to return arriving noncitizens without authorization at ports of entry to their countries of 
origin, without delay and without an immigration court proceeding.  INA § 235(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1225(b)(1) (2012).  Expedited removals have risen from 23,487 in total in 1997, to a total of around 
193,000 in 2013, constituting 44% of all removals.  DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. OFFICE OF IM-
MIGRATION STATISTICS, 1997 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND  
NATURALIZATION SERVICE 166 (1999); JOHN F. SIMANSKI, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. OF-
FICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2013, at 1 
(2014). 
 264 See, e.g., INA § 241(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (2012); Apprehension and Detention of Aliens 
Ordered Removed, 8 C.F.R. § 241.8 (2001).  Particular harms arise at the intersections of expedited 
removals and reinstatement of removals, which Professor Jennifer Lee Koh describes as “legal black 
holes.”  Jennifer Lee Koh, When Shadow Removals Collide: Searching for Solutions to the Legal Black 
Holes Created by Expedited Removal and Reinstatement, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 24–25 (2018). 
 265 In administrative proceedings, individuals can be deported before seeing a judge.  INA § 238, 
8 U.S.C. § 1228 (2012); Expedited Removal of Aggravated Felons, 8 C.F.R. § 238.1 (2016).  For a 
discussion of expedited removal, reinstatement of removal, and administrative removal, see Shoba 
Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Rise of Speed Deportation and the Role of Discretion, 5 COLUM. J. RACE 
& L. 1, 6–10 (2014). 
 266 A stipulated order of removal is a deportation order entered without a hearing and signed by 
an immigration judge, constituting “a conclusive determination of the alien’s removability from the 
United States.”  INA § 240(a)(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(d) (2012).  ICE described stipulated removal 
orders as “a good avenue for judicial economy in that they create operational efficiencies for both 
the immigration and criminal courts.”  U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, PROTECTING 
THE HOMELAND: A TOOL KIT FOR PROSECUTORS 32 (Apr. 2011).  Ninety-six percent of indi-
viduals who signed stipulated orders between 2004 and 2011 did not have a lawyer.  JENNIFER 
LEE KOH ET AL., DEPORTATION WITHOUT DUE PROCESS 8 (Sept. 2011); see also Jennifer Lee 
Koh, Waiving Due Process (Goodbye): Stipulated Orders of Removal and the Crisis in Immigration 
Adjudication, 91 N.C. L. REV. 475, 495 (2013). 
 267 AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, AMERICAN EXILE: RAPID DEPORTATIONS THAT BYPASS 
THE COURTROOM 2 (Dec. 2014).  These proceedings also routinely deny asylum seekers the op-
portunity to apply for asylum.  See U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, REPORT ON 
ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL, VOLUME I: FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS 
4 (Feb. 2005); U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, BARRIERS TO PROTECTION: 
THE TREATMENT OF ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL 22 (2016) [hereinafter 
USCIRF, BARRIERS TO PROTECTION].  The President’s tweet advocating that prospective en-
trants to the country should be immediately deported “with no Judges or Court Cases,” Donald J. 
Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 24, 2018, 8:02 AM), https://twitter.com/ 
realDonaldTrump/status/1010900865602019329 [https://perma.cc/6MJB-M753], articulates a proposal 
that is already close to the de facto norm, see Jennifer Lee Koh & Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Opinion, 
Deport, Not Court? The U.S. Is Already Doing That, L.A. TIMES (June 30, 2018), http://www. 
latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-koh-wadhia-deportations-20180630-story.html [https://perma.cc/ 
7T24-UXGC].  
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to coerce individuals to become the agents of their own removal, or self-
deport.  In this refurbished system, frontline agents of Customs and  
Border Patrol (CBP) and the Office of Field Operations (OFO) wield 
tremendous power.268  CBP, for example, routinely intercepts arriving 
noncitizens at ports of entry along the southern border, including on 
bridges, and convinces them to turn back in contravention of their right 
to seek asylum.269  Government observers have found that immigration 
officers regularly coerce individuals to accept “voluntary” returns and 
departures by signing removal forms they cannot read or do not under-
stand.270  Immigration officers also pressure individuals to take plea 
agreements requiring them to waive their rights to trial and appeal, and 
sometimes containing immigration waivers compelling them to relin-
quish their asylum or protection claims.271  When individuals self-deport 
within the deportation system in this way, as with voluntary departures, 
the government regains some of the control over a person’s departure 
that it relinquishes when they self-deport outside of it. 
In addition to normalizing skeletal procedures, toward similar ends, 
the Executive has increasingly subjected noncitizens to punitive, car-
ceral detention conditions, including freezing holding cells called “ice 
boxes,”272 as well as lengthy and potentially indefinite sentences.273  
More recently, it has also chosen to exercise its discretion to selectively 
enforce deportation laws in spectacularly harsh ways.  Perhaps most 
notoriously, it has separated children from their parents and prosecuted 
these parents for illegal entry or reentry.274  In the summer of 2017, the 
Executive increased its use of this practice,275 and in spring 2018, it sep-
arated around 2000 children from their parents over the course of about 
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 268 In 2005, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) had already 
found “alarming” evidence that CBP and OFO were routinely conducting their responsibilities to 
create inaccurate, incomplete, and unreliable records for immigration law judges.  USCIRF, BAR-
RIERS TO PROTECTION, supra note 267, at 19. 
 269 See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, PUNISHING REFUGEES AND MIGRANTS: THE TRUMP  
ADMINISTRATION’S MISUSE OF CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS 15–16 (Jan. 2018).   
 270 USCIRF recommended in 2014 that CBP ensure OFO officers and Border Patrol agents un-
derstand they have no authority to reject or assess claims of fear or eligibility for asylum.  USCIRF, 
BARRIERS TO PROTECTION, supra note 267, at 32–33; see also AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, 
supra note 267, at 5, 21.  December 2013 statistics from ICE show 23,455 voluntary returns took 
place in FY 2013.  Id. at 23. 
 271 See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 269, at 19–20.  One federal public defender from 
Florida observed that the government uses “the hammer of threat of prosecution and a long prison 
sentence to [convince immigrants to] give up the rights in an immigration case.”  Id. at 20. 
 272 USCIRF, BARRIERS TO PROTECTION, supra note 267, at 58. 
 273 See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 868 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing the 
potentially indefinite detention, without bond, of certain categories of aliens awaiting removal  
proceedings).  
 274 HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 269, at 24. 
 275 See id. 
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six weeks.276  White House Chief of Staff John Kelly defended the policy 
against a national uproar as a “tough deterrent,” declaring that the 
“name of the game is deterrence”;277 Attorney General Jefferson Sessions 
stated the policy was “necessary” to keep people from “stamped[ing]” the 
borders.278  ICE has since denied bond to parents separated from their 
children who are eligible to apply for asylum and distributed forms to 
coerce them to relinquish their claims and agree to removal in exchange 
for the return of their children.279  One parent declared in a pending 
court case that the officers “said the children would not return [and that] 
‘it is the price you pay for crossing the border.  We do this so that when 
you return to your countries you do not return, and so you tell your 
relatives not to come because we will take your children from you.’”280 
Indeed, the current Administration’s commitment to spectacle ap-
pears to stem from the purpose of encouraging immigrant communities 
to leave.  Deterrence measures, for example, clearly and openly intend 
to harness the indirect effects of direct enforcement to discourage people 
from entering unlawfully and encourage those who have entered unlaw-
fully to leave.  However, selective, widely broadcast cruelty by the fed-
eral government to immigrants, combined with clear expressions of hos-
tility directed at immigrant communities,281 does more than just produce 
imminent threats.  It affects a broader community by triggering fear-
based responses even before a law or policy is actually implemented.282  
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 280 Declaration of Maricela Batres at 2, Washington v. Trump, No. 18-cv-00939 (W.D. Wash. July 
2, 2018). 
 281 For instance, the Trump Administration has justified its zero-tolerance policy by citing “in-
fest[ation]” by immigrants.  Hamed Aleaziz, Trump’s Claim that Migrants “Infest” Country Seen as 
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Within this framework, many of the current Administration’s actions 
gain coherence, including its vocal embrace of a zero-tolerance policy 
with respect to unauthorized immigration;283 its implementation of 
travel bans against persons from a number of majority-Muslim coun-
tries;284 and its vows to add 5000 agents to CBP and 10,000 agents to 
ICE,285 terminate Temporary Protected Status for individuals from 
Haiti and El Salvador,286 retaliate against sanctuary cities and states 
with raids,287 attempt to denaturalize immigrant citizens,288 expand ex-
pedited removal,289 and build a 2000-mile border wall between the 
United States and Mexico.290  These policy announcements may or may 
not ever result in actual or successful policies.  Nonetheless, their official 
announcement itself has a non-negligible impact.  It contributes to the 
suffering, subordination, and self-deportation of both the people who 
are their clear targets and the citizens who are part of their networks.291  
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Private citizens and anti-immigrant vigilantes further appear to under-
stand these kinds of official expressions as a directive to perform the 
kind of discrimination that has historically been their province.  The 
Administration’s cues have energized and emboldened such networks, 
likely contributing to the nationwide surge in hate crimes and white 
supremacist–organized activity in recent years.292 
Despite the massive growth of the deportation system, as of 2010, 
ICE had the capacity to remove less than 2% of the 22 million  
unauthorized persons then present in the United States.293  This circum-
stance is popularly called the country’s “immigration crisis.”  The pa-
rameters of the raging national debate it has elicited are set by the poles 
of advocacy for mass deportation and mass amnesty.  Amidst much in-
tense dispute, there is some consensus that two conditions distinguish 
the situation in particular: first, the presence of an excessive number of 
deportable people in the country, and second, a corresponding excess of 
immigration laws that remain largely unenforced.  Most agree, too, that 
these conditions are symptomatic of a dysfunctional deportation system. 
These same conditions, however, also index the vigorous operation 
of self-deportation logic working through the individual deportation sys-
tem and beyond it.  The contemporary individual deportation system 
fosters a logic of self-deportation in two principal ways: first, by strip-
ping process to produce opportunities to coerce individuals already 
within the deportation system, who may face indefinite detention or the 
permanent loss of their children, into agreeing to their removal by the 
state; and second, by selectively enforcing deportation laws in especially 
harsh and painful ways, to magnify the spectacle of this suffering as a 
threat, a deterrence, or a directive to those outside of the system.  The 
first way, self-deportation within the deportation system, escalates the 
total volume of removals and, by reducing costs, expands the capacity 
of the formal removal system.  However, the second way, the use of the 
deportation system to create terror and subordination, may have more 
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far-reaching effects because of the sheer scale of the population for 
whom deportation is now a threat.  Indeed, despite the growth of the 
deportation system, a century of government acquiescence in private 
employers’ creation of incentives to migrate has grown a deportable 
population that still exceeds the overall system’s removal capacity to an 
extreme extent.  This legally fashioned gap — which is steadily being 
exacerbated by the federal government’s pursuit of measures to  
deauthorize more and more groups of people — raises questions about the 
deportation system’s function.  Far from obscuring the end of removal, the 
government now vigorously brandishes it as the justification for its pro-
grams and policies.  History, however, instructs us to look past what self-
deportation policy avows to what it accomplishes in the contemporary en-
vironment: the subordination of an ever-widening population vulnerable 
to exploitation and not desired as a part of the nation’s polity. 
III.  A NATION SHAPED BY SELF-DEPORTATION 
The history of self-deportation imparts a number of lessons that help 
us to better understand immigration law and policy in the United States 
as a whole.  It shows us that the nation’s removal system is not limited 
to deportation laws and direct deportations, but rather that the govern-
ment’s capacity expands by making other entities into agents of self-
deportation policy, especially the individuals it seeks to remove.  Doc-
trines such as preemption and the Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition 
on subfederal public discrimination have distinguished the roles of sub-
federal governments, businesses, and private citizens with respect to re-
moval.  The policy’s history also indicates that, across historical situa-
tions, removal has not comprised an end in itself: rather, governments 
have pursued removal as part of other goals — first, control of land, 
and, after establishing control of the territory, control of labor.  This Part 
elaborates on these lessons, with particular attention to how the roles of 
different agents and the goals of the policy changed after abolition and 
the creation of the individual deportation system.  It concludes by assessing 
the structural limitations and costs of the policy based on this analysis. 
Self-deportation policy expands the government’s capacity by direct-
ing the costs of removal away from the government to other entities, 
and in particular, to the group that it seeks to remove.294  Further, self-
deportation policy demonstrates that removal policy is not just  
government-administered.  Private entities, as well as federal and  
subfederal agents, create the conditions that cause individuals to self-
deport.  In particular, across historical circumstances, governments have 
delegated a large role in creating pressures upon the groups they seek to 
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remove to the private sphere.  Because private entities, especially  
public-facing private entities, interact with the targets of removal policy 
on the ground, they hold a great deal of power to make these individu-
als’ everyday lives — at which the policy aims — unbearable.  Thus, 
the private citizens who are members of the community in which unau-
thorized people live — their employers, teachers, service providers, 
coworkers, and neighbors, for example — carry out the work of discrim-
ination in ways that range from exclusion to active harassment and pri-
vate whistleblowing.  Self-deportation policy therefore operates through 
a penumbra that allocates power to private entities and vigilantes who 
are energized by official expressions of anti-immigrant animus, both  
federal and subfederal.  Furthermore, it works within a landscape  
characterized by uneven racial distributions of power and property that 
it historically helped to shape.  The intimate historical relationship  
between self-deportation policy and the production of property  
entitlements explains the policy’s power to mobilize communities of  
private persons acting in their own interests and pit them against others 
whom they perceive to be a threat.  The government’s use of spectacle 
and expressive statements directed to private citizens suggests that at 
least some policymakers understand these motivations and their own 
power to draw on this force. 
From the period of the early Republic, federal courts have sought to 
prohibit states and municipalities from legislating independent  
self-deportation regimes.  Congress then constitutionalized this principle 
against public discrimination with the Fourteenth Amendment.  The 
Court has repeatedly checked subfederal power — by invoking preemp-
tion in Indian Affairs against southeastern states’ extension laws, equal 
protection against western states’ and municipalities’ Chinese exclusion 
laws, and preemption in the field of immigration against the recent  
nationwide wave of subfederal self-deportation bills.  In each instance 
that the Court has limited subfederal attempts to create an independent 
removal regime, however, the legislative and executive branches have 
then shown that they are responsive to subfederal expressions of agita-
tion by pursuing major ramp-ups to the federal deportation system.295 
In particular, the establishment of the individual deportation system 
during the era of Chinese exclusion introduced a seismic transformation 
to the structure of self-deportation policy by expanding the federal gov-
ernment’s own role.  With the creation of the individual deportation 
system, the federal government substantially increased its control over 
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removal and strengthened its formal ability to coordinate the different 
actors that have long enacted self-deportation policy under its watch.  It 
created new opportunities to provoke self-deportation within the depor-
tation system while growing an impressive capacity for direct removal, 
bringing diverse forms of removal under its oversight.  When govern-
ments relied wholly on indirect tactics, they retained no control or 
knowledge about how many would stay out or leave, or where they 
would go; but when government agents deport someone — whether by 
process or lack of it — they regain control over the manner, time, and 
geographical coordinates of that person’s removal.  Since this develop-
ment, the federal government has largely limited the subfederal role to 
expanding the capacity and reach of the deportation system.  It has fur-
ther systematized this delegation with a wide range of formal  
agreements that enlist states’ and municipalities’ aid in apprehending 
unauthorized persons.296  Although the role of private citizens in the 
deportation system is minimal, the federal government also depends 
heavily and increasingly upon private corporations in order to detain 
the people it apprehends.297 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, from the beginning, the deportation system 
has worked to maximize its self-deportation effects.  That is, the threat 
of a harsh deportation regime has conditioned people’s lives and con-
trolled their behavior, both inside and outside of the deportation system.  
Indeed, the relationship between self-deportation and direct deportation 
can be summarized as follows: 1) the two removal strategies present 
qualitatively distinct alternatives, and 2) the deportation system always 
serves a double function, since deportation laws also have a self- 
deportation effect.  The federal government immediately began to  
harness the indirect as well as direct effects of the deportation system, 
as demonstrated by the Mexican removal during the Great Depression, 
and its evolving deportation policy continues to reflect self-deportation 
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aims.  Its decisions, in particular, to create spectacles from the violence 
of policies well after their creation and implementation, such as family 
separation, denaturalization, and the extreme streamlining of protec-
tions within the system, suggest an independent meta-policy — one that 
seeks to maximize the reach of the system’s threat.  The self-deportation 
function of deportation laws therefore allows us to more precisely under-
stand an effect often referred to rather nebulously as a “culture of fear.” 
The use of the deportation system for indirect removal may be more 
efficacious than its use for direct removals.  As discussed above, the 
system is technically inadequate for directly removing a population that 
is estimated at 22 million people; the biopower and administrative ex-
penses that the individual deportation system requires make it simply 
unsuited for a task of this scale.298  While streamlining the process has 
greatly magnified its capacity for direct removal, such modifications 
cannot cure the inherent structural limitation of the system in proportion 
to its target.  Without trivializing the violence and escalation of the scale 
of the government’s deportations, it is important to recognize that no 
escalation or expansion of this system — even with its self-deportation 
effects — would be sufficient to remove the entire unauthorized popu-
lation in the United States.  This limitation is further exacerbated by the 
fact that the government appears to be prioritizing the growth of this 
margin, by continuously deauthorizing additional groups. 
However, the history of self-deportation instructs us that self- 
deportation policy has worked consistently to achieve an unstated goal 
other than removal itself.  Discourse about immigration law and policy 
focuses almost exclusively on the deportation system and its avowed 
purpose of removal and the prevention of unauthorized entry.  However, 
the development of removal policy after abolition suggests that this fo-
cus obscures another consequence of self-deportation policy — control-
ling noncitizen labor.299  Indeed, the insufficiency of the self-deportation 
and deportation systems together to effect removal of all unauthorized 
persons in the country, and their effects of subordinating this massive 
population instead, suggest that the policy’s function of regulating  
foreign labor after abolition and the close of the frontier has flourished 
wildly over the last century.  As in the past, the mechanism of self- 
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deportation inherently places conditions upon presence: targeted indi-
viduals must leave, or submit to subordination and vulnerability to ex-
ploitation if they stay.300  Under the modern removal system, the condi-
tional subordination this policy imposes as an alternative to removal 
suggests the two outcomes are complementary: the presence of these  
individuals may be tolerable or even desirable, as long as they remain 
compliant with the policy.301  If we attend to both goals, the govern-
ment’s increasingly dramatic displays of its deportation power may even 
seem to constitute a response to critiques of the discriminatory effects 
of its immigration policy.  The spectacles of cruelty the government  
enacts on deportees emphasize the goal of removal, rather than subor-
dination, in a manner that tends to obstruct our appreciation of the ef-
fects of its removal policy on the social fabric of the nation. 
To the extent that deportation laws produce results other than  
deportation, they produce subordination.  It is because the threat of  
deportation shapes the contours of people’s everyday lives that, in  
Professor Daniel Kanstroom’s words, the system functions “as a labor 
control device, a kind of extra tool in the hands of large businesses (and, 
for that matter, American families seeking nannies, gardeners, and so 
forth) to provide a cheap, flexible, and largely rightless labor supply.”302  
Kanstroom here captures the way that subordination, like removal, re-
quires the collective, coordinated efforts of the federal system with  
private entities, especially employers across the spectrum of scale, from 
major corporations to small businesses and individual families.303  In-
deed, legislation that ostensibly seeks to hold employers accountable for 
employing unauthorized employees frequently operates to render those 
employees even more vulnerable.304  In the current chapter of self- 
deportation, the federal government leans particularly heavily on the 
deportation system’s capacity to produce fear and a culture of  
subordination — thereby increasing the power of private actors vis-à-
vis individuals, who become less able to access the protections of law 
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enforcement of any kind.305  The federal government can increase these 
effects simply by expanding the population subject to the threat of de-
portation, not just legislatively, but by unprecedentedly making all de-
portable people enforcement priorities and by terminating and stream-
lining protections that have traditionally been available to  
unauthorized persons. 
Nonetheless, the same aspects of self-deportation that increase the 
government’s capacity for removal and subordination also generate crit-
ical structural limitations for the tactic.  First, the delegation of agency 
to the targeted group has significant limits with respect to the goal of 
removal.  Shifting the cost of removal to deportees means that people of 
few means often cannot go far, and they frequently cross state, rather 
than national, boundaries.  Multiple chapters of the history of self- 
deportation instruct us that in order for people to self-deport, they must 
have somewhere else to go.  In the early nineteenth century, recognizing 
this limitation, the government promised tribes alternate lands for their 
own and sought to secure lands for emancipated slaves to “colonize.”  In 
the recent aftermath of subfederal self-deportation bills, evidence shows 
that people frequently returned to their homes even after self- 
deporting.306  The most efficacious way to promote self-deportation 
would be to refrain from making people’s home countries unsafe, unfea-
sible places to live, to the extent that such external conditions are within 
an enacting government’s control.  The more dangerous, economically 
difficult, and insupportable life elsewhere remains, the less likely people 
will be to self-deport, and the more likely it is that the policy’s effects 
will stop at its mechanism — subordination. 
Additionally, the modern era poses unique challenges to the use of 
self-deportation because of the policy’s structural reliance on private ac-
tors, over which the government retains little control.  Because private 
actors must repeat official hostile gestures in countless institutional and 
extra-institutional contexts to create self-deportation conditions, the pol-
icy will fail to the extent that those private actors do not act in the ways 
that the government anticipates.  The policy now targets people who 
are remarkably integrated in American society and relies on a more di-
verse polity than ever before, so that the polity’s members may not as 
uniformly be willing to assume the role of promoting self-deportation as 
in past eras.  A government that chooses to pursue a self-deportation 
policy likely also counts on the weakness of modern social relations as a 
background condition; but where private citizens are willing to provide 
significant aid to one another, the policy is likely to fail. 
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A government’s choice to shift costs to subfederal entities comes with 
similar limitations.  States and municipalities whose resources the fed-
eral government seeks to marshal for its deportation system may have 
different priorities and refuse to accept this role.  Indeed, state and local 
sanctuary policies are perhaps the most visible and powerful institu-
tional responses to the effects of federal self-deportation.  Subfederal 
power to refuse this role therefore ensures that the policy can operate 
only irregularly across the country, even if the regime is national in 
scope.  Further, despite their limited role in the federal self-deportation 
scheme, subfederal entities also retain powers of official expression that 
can directly counter official expressions of hostility, in keeping with the 
welcoming role that is traditionally their province.307 
A clear assessment of self-deportation’s limitations and costs should 
motivate governmental, institutional, and private responses to U.S.  
immigration policy.  Because the policy interpellates such a broad range 
of actors, the costs of self-deportation are high for everyone, economi-
cally,308 socially, and politically.  When a government shifts the costs of 
removal to the group it targets, departing individuals are forced to aban-
don the lives they have built in this country, sometimes over many  
decades.  The policy also has more than a material impact on self- 
deportees, which is further exacerbated by its impact on their families 
and immediate communities, who may face removal or economic 
ruin.309  Further, private and institutional actors frequently rely on ra-
cial heuristics to do the work of discrimination, which means they target 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 307 MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW, supra note 3; Rodríguez, supra note 234. 
 308 The immediate outflux of large numbers of Latino workers after the passage of H.B. 56 dev-
astated poultry and agricultural industries, helping make Alabama “the worst economy in the 
Southeast.”  Benjamin D. Galloway, Casenote, The Beginning of the End: United States v. Alabama 
and the Doctrine of Self-Deportation, 64 MERCER L. REV. 1093, 1106 (2013) (quoting Joey  
Kennedy, Alabama Has the Worst Economy in the Southeast. Wonder Why?, AL.COM (Oct. 25, 
2012, 12:17 PM), http://blog.al.com/jkennedy/2012/10/alabama_has_the_worst_economy.html 
[https://perma.cc/T8AB-V92W]); see also AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, ANTI-IMMIGRANT OR-
DINANCES HAVE REAL ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL COSTS FOR CITIES THAT ENACT THEM: 
A SURVEY OF THE COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF ANTI-IMMIGRANT MEASURES, (2009), 
http://observatoriocolef.org/_admin/documentos/costofantiimmig.pdf [https://perma.cc/HDA6-RXXG]. 
Cities that passed such legislation, moreover, incurred millions of dollars in litigation costs to defend 
them.  See, e.g., Muzaffar Chishti & Claire Bergeron, Hazleton Immigration Ordinance that Began 
with a Bang Goes out with a Whimper, MIGRATION POLICY INST. (Mar. 28, 2014), https:// 
www.migrationpolicy.org/article/hazleton-immigration-ordinance-began-bang-goes-out-whimper 
[https://perma.cc/N3DH-UASY]; Jon Mcclure, Farmers Branch Settles Last Part of Lawsuit over 
Rental Ordinance for $1.4 Million, DALL. NEWS (June 2014), https://www.dallasnews.com/ 
news/farmers-branch/2014/06/03/farmers-branch-settles-last-part-of-lawsuit-over-rental-ordinance- 
for-1.4-million [https://perma.cc/UR3Q-3ZTN]. 
 309 The human costs of family separations, inability to report crimes, and limitations on mobility 
are especially high for women, who are more vulnerable to exploitation at home and in the work-
place.  See, e.g., Jorge R. Fragoso, Comment, The Human Cost of Self-Deportation: How Attrition 
Through Enforcement Affects Immigrant Women and Children, 28 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 69, 
  
2019] SELF-DEPORTATION NATION 1939 
a group far larger than the actual unauthorized population in the United 
States.310  The subordination of a major part of the national population 
creates public health hazards in many respects, including ubiquitous  
violence that stems from racial division and vigilante activity.  The  
government’s reliance on these tools for maintaining the economy de-
stroys the possibility of the peaceful enjoyment of life for all.  This bleak 
situation, however, is one in which all actors with a role in the removal 
system have a stake, and is one which they can also affect.  States,  
localities, and private actors can counter this policy by working to make 
life more viable for communities at whom the laws are aimed, in ways 
that neutralize their harm. 
Finally, because self-deportation policy operates indirectly and dif-
fusely, it presents issues of transparency and rule of law, as indirect reg-
ulation is more likely to do than direct forms of regulation in general.  
The pervasive degree to which the policy has escaped comprehensive 
description and analysis makes the extent of the power it has drawn 
from its own obscurity an open question.  It appears, however, that a 
government that relies significantly on a policy designed to shift both 
expense and control away from it wagers much on the general  
population’s ignorance about this choice.  It will stake a great deal on a 
policy whose effectiveness is largely predicated on a lack of public un-
derstanding of what the policy is and how it works.  By choosing to 
work through self-deportation, a government delegates away the power 
to decide the policy’s effectiveness, which hinges on whether or not sub-
federal entities and private citizens will become agents of removal and 
subordination.  With respect to the outcomes of its immigration system, 
it leaves the public with significant room to call its bluff. 
CONCLUSION 
This historical account of self-deportation explains how its evolution 
has shaped the policy’s present dimensions and illuminates its current 
role in the larger U.S. immigration system.  Under this indirect mode of 
regulation, one common logic mobilizes a range of different kinds of 
laws, including civil, criminal, immigration, alienage, and public bene-
fits laws: the idea that people can be made to remove themselves by 
attacking different aspects of people’s everyday lives.  The basic ele-
ments of this attack include targeting their ability to keep their families 
together, access the protections of the legal system, move through public 
space without fear of public or private violence, and obtain shelter, em-
ployment, healthcare, and education.  Today, this indirect policy serves 
two functions, although one tends to overshadow the other: removal and 
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control of labor.  Since its mechanism subordinates its target group  
relative to other members of the polity, self-deportation policy places 
conditions upon presence.  Individuals can submit to the vulnerability 
imposed upon them, or leave. 
Colonial governments’ recognition that it was not necessary to use 
direct methods to effect the removal of native peoples from the lands 
they coveted imparted a searing lesson for removal policy in the United 
States.  Even after the creation of a federal system for direct removal, 
the use of this system was still framed by the recognition that indirect 
methods were a powerful tool.  Self-deportation policy in the modern 
era is consequently a palimpsest: contemporary state and municipal  
attempts to pass independent self-deportation legislation echo past chap-
ters of its life, while the evolving deportation system continues to trans-
form self-deportation policy in new directions.  This cycle has  
produced its growth: repeatedly, courts have found subfederal self- 
deportation legislation preempted, and repeatedly, the legislative and 
executive branches have responded by exercising their supremacy in the 
domain of removal to dramatically escalate direct deportations. 
The federal government coordinates its own actions with those of 
subfederal and private entities to enact this policy.  Most visibly, it di-
rects deportation policy to achieve removal and labor control at once; it 
partners with private corporations and enlists states’ and municipalities’ 
aid to expand capacity of the deportation system.  This system further 
operates within a broader climate also shaped by the federal govern-
ment’s coordination.  Most importantly, the federal government, with 
help from states and municipalities, delegates discrimination to private 
entities, who are best positioned to perform it because they interact with 
people in the register that the policy attacks — their everyday lives.  
These delegations to public and private entities, however, shift control 
away from the federal government, along with costs, rendering the pol-
icy susceptible to failure on its own terms in the event that their interests 
become misaligned and its partners refuse to cooperate. 
Understanding the individual deportation system as a host for self-
deportation policy clarifies the logic behind some of its most controver-
sial characteristics — the government’s spectacles of cruelty, and its con-
tinued expansion of an unauthorized population already exceeding 
22 million people, along with an already bloated, mostly unenforced im-
migration code.  These features are symptoms of more than a dysfunc-
tional deportation system: they index the vibrancy of self-deportation 
logic as it operates through the deportation system today.  Far from a 
marginal, recent experiment with alternatives to the more loudly con-
tested issue of direct deportation, self-deportation policy both animates 
the individual deportation system and shapes the context in which its 
indirect effects work.  Without seeing how direct and indirect strands of 
removal policy developed together and in relation to one another, it is 
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not possible to understand the dynamics and scope of the immigration 
system as a whole. 
